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1. Introduction 
 
Ever since Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, it has been a recipient of 
structural funds through EU regional policy.
1
 The structural funds were created to 
improve the economic prospects of the European regions. According to the European 
Commission, "EU regional policy is an investment policy. It supports job creation, 
competitiveness, economic growth, improved quality of life and sustainable 
development." (European Commission, 2011e)  
 
European regional policy is best described as a policy, the making of which is 
characterised by a plurality of participants: the local, regional, national and EU-level 
actors, both public and private, participate in the design and implementation of the 
Structural Fund programmes. Through the partnership principle, the sub-national and 
private actors not only take part in the implementation of regional policy, but also in the 
formulation of the programmes. This thesis examines how these actors attempt to shape 
the content of EU regional policy. The focus is on the design of the next programme 
period, from 2014 to 2020. In the 2014–2020 programme period, the structural funds 
are administered and allocated according to investment priorities set in a „Partnership 
Contract‟. The Partnership Contract is designed by the national governments, with 
significant input by regional, local, and private actors, in cooperation with the European 
Commission, according to the partnership principle. The regional policy funds are spent 
and administered according to the priorities set in the Partnership Contract. This thesis 
takes the Partnership Contract as a starting point, and examines how different policy 
actors endeavour to influence its content. 
 
It is often argued that EU regional policy epitomises a mode of decision-making typical 
to the political system of the European Union, multi-level governance (MLG). Multi-
level governance is a political theory based on the idea that "the state shares power with 
emerging bodies above and below it as well as with the institutions of market and civil 
society”. (Keating 2002, pp. 215) When analysing decision-making that takes place in a 
multi-level governance context, traditional political theories are not particularly fruitful 
                                               
1 The terms cohesion policy and regional policy are used interchangeably in this paper. 
2
 The Partnership Contract will also set the strategies for the European Fisheries Fund and the European 
   2 
in explaining how and why policy changes. The non-hierarchical and horizontal spread 
of decision-making authority and power is best analysed through a theory that is 
cognisant of this diffusion of power and initiative. What is required to analyse MLG 
political systems is a thorough analysis of the networks that interact in the particular 
policy field to shape the policy examined. When we understand how the policy 
networks that function in the policy field are structured, and how the different actors 
active in them advance their position, we can explain actual policy outcomes.  
 
This thesis employs Paul Sabatier's and Hank Jenkins-Smith's (Sabatier, 1998) 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) model for the study of EU regional policy 
networks in Finland. The ACF model is a policy networks theory that seeks to explain 
policy change through the analysis of policy networks in a policy subsystem, such as 
EU regional policy. This thesis examines the Finnish EU regional policy subsystem. In 
the end I provide an assessment of the applicability of the ACF model to the study of 
policy networks in EU regional policy in Finland. 
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1.1. Definitions 
 
Advocacy coalition 
This thesis lends the concept of advocacy coalitions from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(Sabatier, 1998). An advocacy coalition is a policy network of like-minded actors, who 
share a common policy goal, and a similar belief system. Then, through coordination, 
the coalition adopts a strategy to advance their policy goals. The coalition may include 
individuals from various organisations and positions. The coalition‟s members are 
united by their policy core, which consists of the issues that these actors consider to be 
the most important regarding a particular policy. 
 
Policy subsystem 
The ACF model is most fruitful when it is applied to the study of a policy subsystem. 
(Sabatier, 1998) A policy subsystem is a policy sector in a given country. For example, 
agricultural policy or environmental policy can be defined as policy subsystems. The 
policy subsystem that this thesis examines is the Finnish EU regional policy subsystem.  
 
Partnership principle 
EU regional policy is designed and implemented according to the partnership principle. 
The principle entails that the principles of regional policy are designed in a cooperative 
process, in which a plentitude of actors from the national, regional, and local level as 
well as the private sector take part. The partnership principle is meant to ensure the 
legitimacy of the structural fund programmes through the incorporation of these actors‟ 
opinions. The partnership principle is also the central organising principle in the work 
of the Working Group for the Preparation of the Structural Fund Programme Period 
2014–2020, whose work this thesis examines.  
   4 
1.2. Research Problem 
 
This thesis examines the actors that advocate policy changes into the nationally 
designed Partnership Contract, on basis of which the structural funds are distributed and 
administered. The objective is to identify what kind of goals these actors have regarding 
the structural fund programmes' investment priorities. Another research objective is to 
examine what kind of policy strategies these actors employ to achieve changes in the 
Partnership Contract. This thesis takes particular interest in the national level of EU 
regional policy. The focus is on the nationally designed investment priorit ies, on the 
basis of which the structural funds are allocated. Most of the funds are spent according 
to criteria that are designed at the national level in the Partnership Contract.
2
  
 
The Commission, member states, and the partners negotiate the Partnership Contract 
(European Commission, 2011e). The Partnership Contract “will set out the 
commitments to concrete actions to deliver Europe 2020 objectives”. (European 
Commission, 2011f) It is tailored separately for each member state, in cooperation with 
the partners. The partners are regional and local actors, and actors from the private 
sector, and representatives of employers, employees, and the industry. Non-
governmental organisations and women‟s rights groups are also partners. 3  In the 
Contract, the member state assesses their development needs and defines their national 
priorities for the programme period. The Partnership Contract is important because it 
sets the rules according to which the Structural Funds are distributed. The contract will 
be in place for the whole 2014–2020 program period. (European Commission, 2011f) 
 
The nationally designed investment priorities set out in the Partnership Contract for 
structural funding determine how the structural funds are allocated and administered.
4
 
Furthermore, the Contract also sets the rules for the coordination of the different 
Structural Funds, and determines the administrative structure for the funds in Finland. 
Hix and Hoyland describe the Structural Fund decision-making process below: 
At the beginning of each programme period, each national government submits a proposal 
to the Commission in the form of a regional development plan or a single programming 
                                               
2
 The Partnership Contract will also set the strategies for the European Fisheries Fund and the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. However, these two funds are not dealt with in this paper. 
3
 For a more complete listing, see chapter European Union Regional Policy. 
4
 For example, the number of structural fund programme areas is determined in the Contract. 
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document5, on the basis of which two- to six-year regional development programmes are 
negotiated between the Commission and the national governments, with significant input 
by the regional authorities concerned. (Hix and Hoyland 2011, pp. 234) 
 
This policy formulation process is the subject matter of this thesis. I examine how the 
different actors who have an interest in the Partnership Contract's content attempt to 
shape and influence the contents of the package. Given the relatively long period of 
time that the national regional development plan is in force (2014–2020), one cannot 
underestimate the importance of the document to the different actors who have an 
interest in receiving EU regional policy funding. Many of the actors are hired by 
projects that are funded through the structural funds. Thus one could expect that it is in 
all partners‟ interest to try to influence the plan. 
 
This thesis is a case study. The focus is on the work of a working group, which acts 
under the Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
6
 This working group‟s task is to 
issue the proposal for the next Partnership Contract between Finland and the European 
Commission. The working group‟s official name is „Working Group for the Preparation 
of the Structural Fund Programme Period 2014–2020‟. It is hereafter referred to as the 
„2014 + Working Group‟ or simply „WG‟.7  
 
The 2014+ Working Group represents a sample of the regional policy networks in 
Finland. As it has been discussed above, the ideal context for the ACF model‟s 
application would be a policy subsystem. However, simply to study the whole EU 
regional policy subsystem in Finland would be an unmanageable task given the high 
number of actors active in the policy subsystem, and the number of different policy 
venues available for them to lobby for their own policy goals. One thus needs a 
representative sample. The 2014+ Working Group was selected due to several reasons. 
Firstly, the group issues the proposal for the content of the Partnership Contract. Given 
the importance of the Partnership Contract, we can assume that all the involved policy 
actors attempt to have their own most important policy goals included in the Contract. 
This lobbying takes place within the 2014 + Working Group. Secondly, the members of 
                                               
5
 To avoid confusion, it should be noted that for the 2014–2020 Structural Fund Programme Period, this 
document is called the Partnership Contract. For the 2007–2013 Programme Period, this same document 
is called the national strategic reference framework (NSRF). 
6
 „Koheesio 2014+ -työryhmä‟ in Finnish. 
7
 For a detailed account of the 2014 + Working Group‟s tasks, see the chapter on regional policy in 
Finland. 
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the WG have been selected according to the partnership principle.
8
 One can therefore 
assume that they are considered to be among the most relevant actors in Finnish EU 
regional policy. One can also assume that these policy actors possess a lot of knowledge 
and expertise of EU regional policy networks in Finland. Thirdly, given their official 
role as partners, these actors are likely to be at the core of EU regional policy networks 
in Finland. It therefore seems appropriate to interview them on the subject. 
 
1.2.1. Research questions 
 
The research questions are: 
1. What are the key policy objectives of the members of the 2014+ 
Working Group regarding the policy priorities to be set out in the 
Partnership Contract? 
 
2. With what kind of arguments do these actors endeavour to advance 
their policy goals? 
 
3. Are there any identifiable ‘advocacy coalitions’ within the 2014+ 
Working Group? 
 
4. If there are advocacy coalitions within the Working Group, what 
accounts for their common policy position? 
 
The first research question examines the 2014+ Group‟s members‟ policy goals 
regarding the Partnership Contract. The second research question aims to clarify the key 
arguments that the actors use to advance their policy goals, and to shed light on the 
reasons why the actors consider these issues to be of vital importance. The third 
research question‟s aim is to examine whether there are any major dividing lines within 
the 2014+ Group, which would clearly divide the group into two or more coalitions, 
whose members clearly have a common policy agenda.
9
 If advocacy coalitions are 
found, the fourth research question examines what unites them. 
  
                                               
8
 The two ministers from the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Jyri Häkämies and Lauri 
Ihalainen, have selected the WG‟s members. 
9
 The deductive approach used in this thesis means that the theory guides the work of the researcher. The 
ACF model, as seen in the theoretical section, encourages us to pay special attention to the major dividing 
lines within the policy subsystem/policy network. Therefore, instead of focusing on the nitty-gritty detail 
of European Structural Fund policy, the thesis takes as it starting point the core themes debated, if there 
are any. These are questions, which the actors themselves identify as fundamental questions. 
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1.2.2. Previous research 
 
 
European Union cohesion policy is a widely studied topic. Many studies have been 
carried out examining the impact of structural funds on the regions. Other studies have 
assessed the effectiveness of the different structural fund mechanisms aimed at 
improving the prospects of European regions. Furthermore, some studies have focused 
on the principle of subsidiarity, and assessed whether the principle is realised in practice 
on the local level. There are also studies that examine the role of networks in regional 
policy. Below I provide a brief summary of these studies. 
 
One of the most relevant studies regarding the topic of this thesis is Michael Kull's 
(2008) doctoral thesis. Kull applies the theoretical concept of multi-level governance to 
the study of the local level of EU governance in Germany and Finland in the case of the 
LEADER+ Community Initiative, an EU policy, which is a part of the EU's cohesion 
strategy, and financed by the structural funds.
10
 Kull examines the status of the local 
level actors in policy-making and the implementation of the LEADER+ Initiative. Kull's 
work is closest to this topic of this thesis as it also applies the theory of multi-level 
governance to the study of regional policy. 
 
In her licentiate thesis, Heini Kapanen (2002) examines the decision-making process 
through which the regions‟ needs are channelled into projects financed through the 
structural funds. The study examines the 1995–1999 programme period, and it focuses 
on the Objective 2 programme regions.
11
 The thesis provides a good picture of the local 
level in regional policy. The paper sheds light on the decision-making processes in 
Finnish EU regional policy, and provides a detailed account of the interests of regional 
level actors in the Finnish regional policy context. 
 
The relationship between the central government and the regions is in a central position 
in this paper. In her thesis, Johanna Huttunen (1999) examines the concept of 
subsidiarity, and its realisation in EU structural fund policy. Huttunen‟s paper examines 
                                               
10
 LEADER+ is a part of the European Commission's strategy to foster rural development. (Kull, 2008, 
pp. 15 & 173) 
11
 Support to Objective 2 regions was classified as “support [to] the economic and social conversion of 
areas experiencing structural difficulties”. (European Union, 2005) 
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the problematic relationship between the regional authorities and the central 
government. Interestingly, she arrives to the same conclusion as this paper when she 
assesses how well the opinions of the regions are taken into account in the preparation 
of the national programmes, as she concludes that the regions are not entirely satisfied 
with the central government administration.  
 
Milla Holopainen (2002) examines the use of business support partly funded by the 
European Union as a tool of regional development in the region of Pohjois-Savo. The 
thesis focuses on years 2000–2002, and it examines the contemporary Objective 1 
region, Pohjois-Savo in Eastern Finland.
12
 The thesis provides a useful theoretical 
insight into cohesion policy decision-making on the micro level. Her paper examines 
regional policy from the point of view of an individual region, and is thus fruitful for 
understanding what kind of interests individual regions have in EU regional policy. 
 
Ismo Pohjantammi (2008) has examined the role of local policy networks in reacting to 
sudden structural changes in the local economy. He examines how the local policy 
networks have reacted to structural change, and assesses the challenges that these actors 
have faced. The study, due to its policy networks approach, provides a recent account of 
the complex web of actors involved in policy-making at the local level. 
 
In sum, there are several works on EU structural fund policy in Finland that examine the 
decision-making process and the underlying principles, on which EU regional policy is 
based. There are studies that assess the effectiveness of EU Structural Fund policy. 
These studies take the region(s) as the starting point for analysis, and examine how well 
the regional needs are dealt with in the structural fund programmes. There are also 
studies that take the theory of EU regional policy as their starting point, and compare 
the reality of EU regional policy to the principles, such as subsidiarity.  
 
This thesis aims to add to the literature by providing a picture of the actors who are 
active in the policy networks in the Finnish EU regional policy arena. Importantly, no 
policy network studies on advocacy coalitions in EU regional policy in Finland have 
                                               
12
 In the 2000–2006 structural fund programme period, support to Objective 1 regions was meant for 
promoting “the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind”. 
(European Union, 2005) 
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been carried out yet employing the ACF model. This paper thus adds to the literature on 
the ACF model, providing an assessment of applicability of model in the Finnish 
context.  
 
The focus in this thesis is not on any specific region in Finland, nor is it on the 
realisation of certain principles, such as the principle of subsidiarity. Naturally these 
two themes are a central part of European regional policy, but they are in a side role in 
this study. Rather, instead of the local, this study approaches EU cohesion policy from a 
broader and more general viewpoint. Its aim is to provide a general overview of the 
group of „players‟ who are active in the Finnish regional policy context, and to examine 
what their main goals are regarding the policy. The 2014+ Working Group forms the 
sample material for this study. 
 
1.2.3. The structure of the thesis  
 
The second chapter examines the context of this study, European Union regional policy. 
It firstly provides a brief summary of how regional policy is made. Secondly it 
discusses the structural funds, the ERDF and the ESF, which are the focus of this paper. 
Thirdly the chapter provides a brief account of the next structural fund programme 
period in 2014–2020, focusing on the Partnership Contract, which sets the Finnish 
priorities for the programme period. Finally the chapter sheds light on the focal point of 
this thesis, the 2014+ Working Group. 
 
The third chapter introduces the theory of multi-level governance (MLG). MLG is the 
theory on which this thesis is based. I examine EU regional policy networks through the 
MLG approach. I also discuss the institutional setting for this thesis, the Finnish 
political system.
13
 
 
The third chapter also introduces and discusses the policy networks approach. The 
chapter also discusses the importance of the partnership principle in giving a more 
                                               
13
 The political system of a country affects whether a multi-level governance system is likely to emerge. 
In highly decentralised countries the level of multi-level governance is likely to be higher than in 
countries where the political system is highly centralised. 
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formal position for the sub-national and private regional policy actors.
14
 The partners 
are in a crucial position in regional policy. Due to their official position, the government 
has to take the partners‟ interests into account in the work of the 2014+ Working group. 
As the partners are in a position to influence the content of EU regional policy
15
, they 
have an interest to organise and coordinate their action as effectively as possible to 
ensure that they are in a good position to shape the content of the Partnership Contract. 
The conditions are thus conducive for networks of partners to have arisen as a result, 
where like-minded members of the working group exchange information, share their 
experiences and opinions, and coordinate their objectives and strategies for their work 
in the 2014+ Working Group, lobbying for their own policy goals. 
 
Importantly, the third chapter introduces the Advocacy Coalition Frameworks (ACF) 
model. The ACF model is a policy networks theory/model that has been created for the 
analysis of policy change. This thesis employs the ACF model to the analysis of policy 
networks within the 2014+ Working Group. The chapter also provides justifications for 
the employment of policy networks theory, and more specifically, for the use of the 
ACF model, to the analysis of EU regional policy networks in the context of the 2014+ 
Working Group. 
 
The research is qualitative, and the method of choice is the interview. More specifically, 
I have carried out elite interviews. I have discussed the use of elite interviews in chapter 
four, and you can also find the questionnaires for the interviews in the appendix. I have 
interviewed six members of the 2014+ Working Group. It has been the aim that the 
sample of interviewees be as representative as possible. 
 
The thesis endeavours to identify whether there are any groupings of actors within the 
2014+ Working Group. The ACF would call these groups of like-minded actors 
                                               
14
 The partnership principle gives a legitimate, official role for the subnational, private, and other actors 
in the design and formulation of EU regional policy. These actors, who include trade unions, 
representative organizations, regional associations, women‟s rights groups, employee and employer 
organizations, are the “partners”. The Finnish structural fund priorities are decided by the 2014+ Working 
group according to the Partnership principle. This working group creates the criteria which are used to 
allocate and distribute the structural funds. It is in a crucial position in terms of the effects which its 
decisions will have on the next Structural Fund Programme period. The Working Group issues the 
proposal for the content of the Partnership Contract. The logic behind the principle is that the 
incorporation of the partners ensures that regional policy is most effective. 
15
 Scholars have debated whether the 'partners' are truly powerful in EU regional policy. There are 
differing views on the topic. For a more extensive discussion, see the chapter on multi-level governance. 
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“advocacy coalitions”. Hence one of the results can be a table of the advocacy 
coalitions, in which the actors are classified together with other actors, who share the 
same belief system, and have similar policy objectives, and have as a consequence 
“teamed up” to coordinate their actions and to promote a similar strategy to achieve 
their policy objectives. However, this is only speculation, as one cannot presume the 
existence of such networks. The findings of the research are discussed in chapter four.
   12 
2. European Union regional policy 
 
European regional policy, or cohesion policy, is a light version of EU social policy. 
According to the European Commission, the purpose of regional policy is "to reduce the 
significant economic, social and territorial disparities that still exist between Europe's 
regions." The policy's purpose is to "bring out the best in every region, make all regions 
more competitive [and] create more and better jobs". (European Commission, 2011) 
Between 2002 and 2013, 347 billion Euros is spent through EU regional policy. The 
money is spent on goals such as creating economic growth and jobs by, for example, 
improving transport links to remote regions, boosting small and medium-sized 
enterprises in disadvantaged areas, investing in a cleaner environment and improving 
education and skills of people. (European Commission, 2011) In the 2007–2013 
programme period, Finland receives funding from two structural funds: the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF). The ERDF and 
the ESF are referred to as the „structural funds‟.  
 
European Union regional policy is based on four main principles: Additionality, 
Partnership, Programming and Concentration. 
 
As the name of the principle of additionality suggests, the regional policy funds are to 
be 'additional' to other (national) funds directed to the regions. According to the 
principle of additionality, “the member states cannot use EU resources to reduce 
national spending on regional development, so EU resources go directly to regions or 
managing authorities rather than to national treasuries.” (Hix and Hoyland 2011, pp. 
234) Additionality is a key condition of the Structural Funds. The additionality principle 
dictates that the funds from the Structural Funds are not meant to replace any other 
source of funding (national or other) targeted at the regions. The principle therefore 
means that despite EU funds made available to certain regions, the national government 
cannot reduce its own investment in the same region. The European Commission 
oversees the realisation of the principle. (European Commission, 2011h) However, it 
has often been argued that this principle has not been realised in practise. Rhodes, in his 
book on policy networks and EU regional policy, writes that the British government did 
exactly what it what not supposed to do according to the rules, that is, it reduced its 
spending on regions that received EU regional policy funds. Despite lip service to the 
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principle, "the government's arrangements served to give only the appearance of 
additionality, without local authorities having extra money to spend." (Rhodes, 1997, 
pp. 152–155) 
 
The partnership principle is arguably the most important of the four principles. It is 
based on the idea that the member states get to tailor the structural fund programmes to 
best suit their own needs. The logic behind the partnership principle is that if the 
member states design their own regional policy priorities, regional policy will be most 
effective and that the funds are spent most effectively (European Commission, 2011i). 
 
The partnership principle, when it was created, led to the increased powers of the sub-
national and private actors in EU regional policy. Bache writes: 
The partnership principle introduced in the 1988 reform of the structural funds aimed to 
maximize the effectiveness of EC regional policy interventions by giving subnational actors 
a formal role in the implementation process for the first time." (Bache, 2005, pp. 166) 
 
In other words, the partnership principle gave a legitimate, official role for the 
subnational actors in the design and formulation of EU regional policy. Before 1988 the 
national governments had decided the national priorities, according to which the 
structural funds were distributed. As a consequence of the 1988 reform, partnerships 
began to emerge and to be established to "design, implement, and monitor structural 
fund programmes" One can speak of the empowerment of the local and regional actors. 
The subnational level emerged as an area of decision-making that was deemed 
important. Indeed, Bache argues that the reform that introduced the principle "was 
central to the development of multi-level governance". (Bache, 2005, pp. 166) 
 
In the European Commission‟s legislative proposal for the next structural fund 
programme period, it is stated that 
For the Partnership Contract and each programme respectively, a Member State should 
organise a partnership with the representatives of competent regional, local, urban and other 
public authorities, economic and social partners, and bodies representing civil society, 
including environmental partners, non-governmental organisations, and bodies responsible 
for promoting equality and nondiscrimination. The purpose of such a partnership is to 
respect the principle of multi-level governance, ensure the ownership of planned 
interventions by stakeholders and build on the experience and know-how of relevant actors. 
 (European Commission, 2011m) 
 
The logic behind the principle is that the incorporation of the partners ensures that 
regional policy is most effective and most suitable to the local needs. Furthermore, it 
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could also be thought to represent an effort to increase the legitimacy of the structural 
fund projects. The incorporation of the partners is meant to ensure this. (Hix and 
Hoyland 2011, pp. 230–231) As seen in the Commission proposal above, the partners 
are many, and they include women‟s rights groups, local actors, civil society actors, and 
other economic and private partners. One can but wonder how the views of all these 
actors can be incorporated into the programmes. Indeed, many scholars have argued that 
this principle has not been realised in the practise. The partners (sub-national authorities 
and private actors) often criticise the national governments for not allowing this 
principle to be realised in practise. 
 
Linked to the partnership principle is the programming principle. According to the 
European Commission, programming “refers to the administrative mechanism used to 
pursue the objectives of the Structural and Cohesion Funds”. (European Commission, 
2011j) This principle basically means that the funding is delivered through the 
multiannual development programmes. (Hix and Hoyland 2011, pp. 230–231) These 
programmes are crucial to how the funds are distributed. In the 2007–2013 Programme 
Period of Structural Funds, there are five Regional Programmes in Finland.
16
 In 
addition, Finland receives structural funding from five Cross-border, transnational and 
interregional co-operation Programmes.
17
 
 
The fourth regional policy principle is the concentration principle, which means that 
“EU assistance measures are concentrated in a series of priority objectives.” (Hix and 
Hoyland 2011, pp. 230–231) The principles that determine which objectives the funding 
is concentrated on change with every programme period. For example, in the 2007–
2013 programme period of the structural funds, the structural fund investments were 
concentrated on least prosperous regions, in line with the Lisbon Strategy.
18
 In the 
forthcoming 2014–2020 programme period, the Europe 2020 Strategy will be the 
guiding policy scheme for the concentration of structural funds. In the debate on the 
future of EU cohesion policy, it has been broadly recognised that EU cohesion policy 
                                               
16
 Operational Programmes: Northern Finland, Western Finland, Åland Islands, Eastern Finland and 
Southern Finland. 
17
 Operational Programmes: Central Baltic, Botnia – Atlantica, North, Northern Periphery, and in 
addition the Baltic Sea Region Programme for 2007–2013. 
18
 The Lisbon Strategy‟s aim is to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion.” (Lisbon European Council, 2000) 
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needs to be better focused on a fewer number of priorities (Bachtler and Mendez, 2010). 
It is also the European Commission‟s strategy to focus on fewer investment priorities.19 
2.1. The structural funds in Finland 
 
Today Finland clearly belongs to the category of net payers in cohesion policy. In other 
words, Finland pays more to the cohesion policy funds than it receives from them. (Yli-
Lahti, 2011) National and European Union legislation directs EU financing. In Finland, 
the Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy acts as the managing authority 
for ERDF and ESF programmes. The provision of duties and powers of the different 
authorities involved in regional policy in Finland are dictated in the Finnish Structural 
Fund Act. (European Union, 2008)
 20
 
 
In the website of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy it is stated that: 
 
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy is responsible for the implementation of the 
European Regional Development Programmes and the European Social Fund Programmes 
in Finland. The ministry guides the other participating actors in the work related to the 
management of the funds. --- When cohesion policy is developed and reformed, the 
ministry prepares the related national policy opinions for them in cooperation with other 
ministries and stakeholders. 
 (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2012)21 
  
From this statement it becomes clear that the mentioned ministry controls the process. 
This statement‟s validity is assessed in the findings. The Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy assesses that Finland will receive approximately EUR 1.7 billion from the 
EU‟s Structural Funds in the 2007–2013 programme period. It is estimated that this sum 
will decrease by approximately half a billion in the next programme period. In line with 
the principle of additionality, these funds are complemented by financing from the 
Finnish state, and the private sector. It is estimated that the share of the Finnish state (75 
% of the sum) and the Finnish municipalities (25 % of the sum) will come up to EUR 
2.01 billion. Furthermore, the share of private financing is estimated at EUR 2.3 billion 
(Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2011b) 
 
  
                                               
19
 See the Commission proposals for the next programme period. 
20
 It should be noted that the Åland Islands have their own, separate structural fund programmes. They 
are not thus covered in this thesis. 
21
 This translation is my own. 
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The key goals of the structural fund programmes in Finland are: 
• Creation of new businesses and jobs; 
• Decreasing unemployment and boosting job creation; 
• Development of regional economy; 
• Improvement of the productivity of enterprises and 
• Promotion of their competitiveness; 
• Raising the level of education; 
• Increasing research and innovation activities. 
 (European Union, 2008) 
 
Despite the fact that the Partnership Contract also sets the strategies for the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and the European Fisheries Fund, this thesis 
focuses on the two structural funds, the ESF and the ERDF. Due to the nature of this 
research (qualitative case study), the researcher feels that he does not have the necessary 
resources at his disposal to examine all the different funds in one thesis. One could also 
argue that, taking into account the theoretical nature of the research problem and the 
deductive nature of this research, the current focus is sufficient for testing the theory, 
the ACF model. The goal of this research is not to make broad generalisations but to 
examine a political phenomenon, the work of the 2014+ Working Group, in detail. Thus 
the inclusion of the other funds to the analysis would not bring much added value to the 
research.  
 
Figure 1: The Proposals Issues by the Commission in June 2011 for the Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2014–2020 (European Commission, 2011k) 
 
The European Commission has proposed to spend EUR 336 billion for cohesion policy 
instruments in the next programme period. (European Commission, 2011e) However, it 
is estimated that the amount of cohesion funding Finland receives will decrease in the 
next programme period due to the new Commission proposals. (Interview E, 2012) 
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2.1.1. European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
 
Of the two structural funds, the ERDF focuses more on what one could call 'hard 
investments'. The ERDF "provides financial support for the development and structural 
adjustment of regional economies, economic change, enhanced competitiveness as well 
as territorial cooperation throughout the EU." In other words, the ERDF is a 
redistributive tool that aims to improve the economic prospects of regional economies. 
Whereas the ESF is more oriented towards the worker, the ERDF is more oriented 
towards jobs, general infrastructure and other investments aimed at job creation. In 
particular, the Fund "contributes towards co-financing investment projects in the areas 
of creating sustainable jobs, infrastructure, support for regional and local development, 
and SMEs." (European Commission, 2011b) In sum, the ERDF‟s goal is to create more 
jobs. Direct aid to companies forms a substantial share of the allocated ERDF funds. 
According to the European Commission, the ERDF finances: 
 direct aid to investments in companies (in particular SMEs) to create sustainable jobs; 
 infrastructures linked notably to research and innovation, telecommunications, 
environment, energy and transport; 
 financial instruments (capital risk funds, local development funds, etc.) to support 
regional and local development and to foster cooperation between towns and regions; 
 technical assistance measures. 
 (European Commission, 2011c) 
 
In the 2007–2013 programme period, the ERDF funds are focused on three priorities: 
Convergence, Regional Competitiveness and Employment, and Territorial 
Cooperation.
22
 In Finland, the ERDF funds are used for developing business, new 
supporting new innovations, facilitating the networking the target group (entrepreneurs), 
and improving the accessibility of areas (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 
2011d). Broadly speaking, the four key themes in the ongoing programme period thus 
are: learning, innovation, accessibility and networking.  Territorial characteristics of a 
region, and its remoteness, as well as a low population density, are taken into account in 
the allocation of the funds (European Commission, 2011c). Finland‟s northernmost 
areas receive special support from the ERDF funds, as they are considered to be 
geographically speaking disadvantaged areas. 
                                               
22
 For more information, see appendix and European Commission, 2011c 
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2.1.2. European Social Fund (ESF) 
 
The ESF forms the „soft‟ investments that were mentioned above. In Finland, the ESF 
funds are targeted to the promotion of people‟s employment and knowledge. The ESF 
invests in people: the Finns‟ employment opportunities are improved through 
investments in “knowledge and professional skills of employees and entrepreneurs”. 
The fund especially targets people who are suffering from long-term unemployment, 
young people, immigrants or disabled people, and others at the risk of social exclusion. 
On the more general level, ESF funds are used in projects, which aim at improving 
educational or training systems, as well as on-the-job-learning, thus attempting to 
improve the educational levels of people on the long term. The EU‟s share of the ESF 
funds in the 2007–2013 period was EUR 615 million. (Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, 2011e) 
 
2.2. The 2014–2020 structural fund programme period 
 
The structural fund programmes are based on a broader EU agenda. For the 2014–2020 
programme period, the broader program is the Europe's Growth and Jobs Agenda, or 
"Europe 2020 Agenda” (European Commission, 2011e).23 The Europe 2020 Agenda is 
the Union‟s growth strategy for the next decade. It sets the broad guidelines for creating 
more jobs and economic growth in the EU. According to the European Commission, the 
Europe 2020 Strategy means that the EU is to become  
“a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy. These three mutually reinforcing priorities 
should help the EU and the Member States deliver high levels of employment, productivity 
and social cohesion. 
 (European Commission, 2011g) 
 
The European Commission draws out a so-called Common Strategic Framework (CSF), 
which translates the Europe 2020 goals into strategic policy priorities for structural fund 
investments. The CSF forms the overall framework for cohesion policy. Once the CSF 
is in place, each Member State and the Commission form together the Partnership 
Contract. The Partnership Contract is based on the broader policy priorities set out in 
the CSF. (European Commission, 2011f) The Commission approves the Partnership 
Contracts drawn nationally. 
                                               
23
 The Europe 2020 Agenda is also referred to as the Europe 2020 Strategy in this paper. 
   19 
 
Importantly, each member state can choose two to three priorities from the menu set out 
in the Europe 2020 Strategy (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2011).
24
 In 
other words, the member states decide, in line with the partnership principle, which 
„themes‟ they focus the investments on. These themes are selected from a list of 
predetermined options designed by the European Commission. The purpose of this is to 
ensure structural policy is in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy.  
2.2.1. Commission proposals for the 2014–2020 programme period 
 
The European Commission published its proposals for cohesion policy in the 2014–
2020 period on the 6
th
 of October 2011. The proposals are based on the Europe 2020 
Strategy, and cohesion policy has a central role in the fulfilment of this strategy. Among 
the key goals for the next structural fund programme period, the Commission wants to 
simplify the management of the structural fund programmes, and to streamline the 
application procedures. Strong thematic centralisation is a central principle in the use of 
the structural funds. Structural funding is to be focused on a few thematic priorities, 
which best promote the competitiveness of regions and employment, and are based on 
the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive economy. (Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, 2011 and European Commission, 2011g)  
 
Broadly speaking, the main goals are increased effectiveness and „streamlining‟ of 
cohesion policy, the concentration on fewer priorities linked to the Europe 2020 
Strategy, and the simplification of the delivery of cohesion policy through 
simplification of the administration of the funds. The aim is to 'cut red tape' and reduce 
the amount of money that goes into the administration of the structural fund projects. 
Furthermore, the Commission wants to simplify and computerise the procedures, and to 
harmonise the eligibility rules for the funding instruments. (European Commission, 
2011l) In addition, the Commission's proposals for the 2014–2020 programme period 
aim at the better coordination of the various structural funds' actions. (European Union, 
2011b)  All in all, the goal thus seems to be a 'lighter' administration for the 
management of the structural funds. The background for this is a perceived 
ineffectiveness in EU regional policy administration: 
                                               
24
 See appendix for the decision establishing the 2014+ Working Group. 
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Experience suggests that in the current programming period, the diversity and 
fragmentation of rules governing spending programmes are often perceived as 
unnecessarily complicated and difficult to implement and control. This imposes a heavy 
administrative burden on beneficiaries as well as on the Commission and Member States, 
which can have the unintended effect of discouraging participation, increasing error rates 
and delaying implementation. This means that the potential benefits of EU programmes are 
not fully realised. 
 (European Commission, 2011m) 
The Commission implies that the money is not going to the rightful recipients, but to the 
complex bureaucracy, which manages the structural fund programmes. Among the main 
proposals for simpler management, the Commission proposed the possibility for 
Member States to merge and reduce the number of authorities in charge of cohesion 
policy. (European Commission, 2011f)  
2.2.2. Partnership Contract 
 
The Commission, member states, and the partners negotiate so-called Partnership 
Contracts, on basis of which the structural funds are distributed (European Commission, 
2011e). The Partnership Contracts "will set out the commitments to concrete actions to 
deliver Europe 2020 objectives”. (European Commission, 2011f) They are the end 
result of negotiations (on the menu of investment priorities set in the Europe 2020 
strategy) in the member states between the state and the partners. Furthermore, in the 
Partnership Contract, Member States will outline how they plan to coordinate the 
different EU funds. (European Commission, 2011f). As a result of the negotiations two 
to three investment priorities will be selected, which then have to be accepted by the 
European Commission. The Partnership Contracts are thus tailored individually for each 
member state, in cooperation with the partners. In Finland the partners consist of 
representatives from: 
 Representatives of ministries (The Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the Ministry of 
Education and Culture, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, ) 
 Representatives of the regional councils (Maakunnan liitto) (Lapin liitto, Pohjois-Pohjanmaan 
liitto, Etelä-Savon liitto, Pirkanmaan liitto, Kymenlaakson liitto, Päijät-Hämeen liitto, Varsinais-
Suomen liitto) 
 Representatives of Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the 
Environment (Elinkeino-, liikenne- ja ympäristökeskus or „ELY-keskus‟) 
 Representative of the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (Kuntaliitto) 
 Finland‟s Central Chamber of Commerce (Keskuskauppakamari) 
 The Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) 
 The Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees (STTK) 
 The Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) 
 Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners (MTK) 
 The Coalition of Finnish Women´s Associations (NYTKIS) 
 Regional Development Companies SEKES ry 
 (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2011) 
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The Partnership Contracts will be concluded in 2013. However, the process for their 
design has already begun. (European Commission, 2011f) According to the European 
Commission, the Partnership Contract will contain: 
 Thematic objectives (Member States can choose out of a menu of 11 objectives in line 
with the “Europe 2020” strategy); 
 Investment priorities for each thematic objective; 
 Conditions which will be the pre-requisite to EU funding (see below); 
 Targets that the Member States plan to reach by the end of the programming period, as 
well as performance indicators and milestones. 
  (European Commission, 2011f) 
 
In addition, the Partnership Contract will also “describe the coordination between EU 
funds at national level” (European Commission, 2010). This is an important aspect of 
the Partnership Contract. It means that the member state can amend the national 
institutional structure, which handles the administration and allocation of the structural 
funds. This could mean changes to the number of staff employed in the administration 
of the structural fund programmes. Or it could mean changing the way ESF and ERDF 
funds are coordinated in Finland. As is seen in the analysis section, this aspect of the 
Partnership Contract has proven to be a point of debate. In sum, the Partnership 
Contract is important because it sets the rules according to which the structural funds 
are distributed, and also provides a clarification on the way the funds are administered. 
The contract will be in place for the whole 2014–2020 program period. The Contract is 
therefore the cornerstone of European regional and structural policy for individual 
countries in the 2014–2020 period. 
2.3. The 2014+ Working Group 
 
Cohesion policy-making takes place at the EU level, at the national level, in the regions, 
and on the local level. There are multiple venues for EU cohesion policy-making in 
Finland. In these forums, the future of cohesion policy is being debated, and different 
policy proposals and ideas discussed. One of these forums, and a rather important one, 
is the Working Group for the Preparation of the Structural Fund Programme Period 
2014–2020. The 2014+ Working Group designs the Finnish structural fund priorities for 
the preparation of the 2014+ structural fund period
25
 according to the partnership 
principle. This working group draws out a proposal for the criteria, which are then used 
to distribute the structural funds. According to the Ministry of Employment and the 
                                               
25
 ‟EU:n alue- ja rakennepolitiikan 2014+ toteutusta valmisteleva työryhmä‟ in Finnish 
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Economy, this is the Working Group‟s „most important task‟. (Yli-Lahti, 2011b) 
Another equally important task for the group is to propose how the different EU funds 
are coordinated in Finland, and how they are managed in relation to the national 
structural policy funds. (Yli-Lahti, 2011b) Therefore, the Working Group is in a crucial 
position in terms of the effects which its proposals will have on the next structural fund 
programme period.  
 
The Working Group was set up by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy in 
March 2011. The task of the Working Group is renew and to implement EU regional 
and structural policy in Finland. On the 20
th
 of October 2011 the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy decided to continue the mandate of the Working Group 
for the next structural fund period starting in 2014. (Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, 2011) The Working Group draws out the proposal for the content of the 
Partnership Contract.
26
 More specifically, the Working Group‟s tasks include: 
1) To issue proposals for the criteria for the investment priorities according to which the 
structural fund funds are allocated in the programme period that starts in 2014, and to 
observe that the preparation and the thematic choices of the upcoming programme period 
are in line with the decisions in the governmental program and the Europe 2020 Strategy; 
 
2) The preparation of the Partnership Contract negotiations (the coordination of the tasks 
related to the different structural funds, including the Agricultural Fund and the Fisheries 
Fund); the fitting together of political objectives and the results of the work of the Regions 
in the preparation for the Partnership Contract; 
 
3) To issue a proposal on the structure of the programmes, the design of the programme 
areas, and the investment priorities for the programmes and the model of governance for 
the programmes 
 
4) To draw out the criteria on the basis of which the cohesion funds are distributed, and 
their effects, in preparation of the final proposals for the budgetary proposals and proposals 
for the content of the criteria, as well as the criteria for the distribution of the funds 
 
5) To set the guidelines for Finland‟s participation to European regional cooperation, to the 
implementation of the Baltic Sea Region Strategy, and to external border cooperation with 
Russia 
 (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2011) 
 
Furthermore, the Working Group‟s task is to ensure that the Finnish government‟s line 
is respected in the design of the structural fund period 2014–2020 and also that the EU‟s 
Europe 2020 Strategy is adhered to, and observed, in the design of the national 
                                               
26
 The government has the final word on the content of the Working Group's final proposal for the 
Partnership Contract. If the government decides that the proposal does not satisfy its conditions, it can 
reject the proposal. However, this situation is not likely to emerge as the government is strongly 
represented in the Working Group through the ministries, who can make sure that the government‟s 
wishes are heard. (Interview A, 2012) 
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programmes. The Working Group thus has responsibilities to two directions. Firstly, the 
Working Group is responsible to the Finnish government. Secondly, the Group is 
responsible for the EU. Furthermore, the individual members of the working group have 
responsibilities towards the organisations that they represent. Given the sum of money 
that is distributed through the structural funds to Finland (estimated between 1.1 and 1.2 
billion in the next programme period), the working group is in a highly powerful 
position.  
 
In its work, the Working Group follows the partnership principle. This means that all 
the partners, who have been listed above, take part in the formulation of the Finnish 
structural fund investment priorities. In practise the Working Group draws the proposal 
for the Partnership Contract. The partnership principle is strongly a part of the Working 
Group‟s working culture.27 According to the decision establishing the  2014+ Working 
Group, the group will also hear representatives from local government and 
environmental organisations, as well as other experts and actors who are considered 
central to structural fund programming. (Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 
2011) In practise the partnership principle is meant to ensure that every working group 
member‟s opinion has to be taken into account. 
 
According to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the Working Group has 
acted as an active discussion forum and channel for the exchange of information for the 
participants. One can thus expect the members of the Working Group to share 
information with each other and to learn from each other. (Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy, 2011)  
                                               
27
 This came out in the interview of an employee of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. (The 
interviewee consented to allowing his/her organisation‟s name to be disclosed.) 
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3. Theoretical framework 
 
This chapter sets the theoretical foundation for this thesis. In a case study, the 
development of a theoretical position is of crucial importance. It comes before anything 
else. One must have a theoretical standpoint before one starts to collect any data. (Yin, 
2009, pp. 36) Sutton and Straw have argued that the theoretical propositions are "a 
story about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur". (Sutton and Straw, 1995, 
pp. 378)  
 
The theoretical framework acts as a guiding light for the researcher. Its role is to help 
him to see behind/through the empirical subject matter, and to help the researcher to see 
the bigger picture. The theoretical framework helps in the choice and actual analysis of 
research material, and enables the researcher to make conclusions based on the material. 
A theory-based approach is especially fruitful to the study of political phenomena when 
the phenomena studied are highly complex. This is especially the case with deductive 
research, to the category to which this thesis belongs. Deduction “is the process of 
proceeding from general principle of theory to specific observations. On the basis of 
theory certain phenomena are predicted. Then events are observed and measured to see 
if they occur as predicted.” (Johnson, Reynolds, and Joslyn, 2001, pp. 32) 
 
However, it is not the idea that the theoretical framework would tie the hands of the 
researcher, and only provide a single way to analyse phenomena. The researcher is still 
able to make choices regarding the material and how to analyse it. Indeed, as we cannot 
assume laboratory-like conditions for the research, where all the variables could be 
controlled for in a highly scientific process, we have to allow for certain flexibility in 
the implementation of the research. Otherwise the researchers could not study real 
world political science phenomena, in which the control of all variables is, if not 
impossible, at least very difficult. Nevertheless, in deductive research the options 
available for the researcher are more limited than they are in other types of research. 
(Johnson, Reynolds, and Joslyn, 2001, pp. 31–32) 
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3.1. Multi-Level Governance 
 
Governance, as understood in the context of EU regional policy, refers to "the basic idea 
that government, identified with the traditional hierarchical state form, has given way to 
a world of diffused authority in which the boundaries between public and private and 
blurred." (Keating 2002, pp. 215) It is not anymore fruitful to think of the world as a 
playground of the old nation states, in which the nation state wields extensive powers, 
controlling most areas of public (and private) life.  
 
The concept multi-level governance, consequently, is based on the idea that "the state 
shares power with emerging bodies above and below it as well as with the institutions 
of market and civil society." (Keating 2002, pp. 215)
28
 Hix and Hoyland (2011) write 
that the concept of multi-level governance was first used to describe EU regional policy. 
(Hooghe, 2002 and Marks, 1993) As more and more scholars became aware of the 
concept and accepted its presumptions, it became a more general theory of EU politics 
that was applied to other policy fields. (Hooghe and Marks, 1996) Then, Hix and 
Hoyland (2011) write, the theory was further developed to incorporate not only the 
three levels of government originally used in the theory (EU, national, and sub-
national), but multiple levels of bargaining, between which decision-making authority 
was shared. (Bache and Flinders, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 2003 and Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank, 1996) 
 
However, many disagree with the view that governments would have lost powers to the 
different levels of government and to the private sector. Moravcsik, writing about the 
concept of multi-level governance, holds that the executive is in fact strengthened by 
the decision-making system of the EU. Due to the fact that decision-making often takes 
place in meetings at the EU level, the executive is the only domestic actor that has the 
capacity to be aware of what is being decided and to take part in the negotiations. 
(Moravcsik, 1994) Indeed, the negotiations over the bailout plans during the recent 
economic crisis have arguably provided evidence in support of this statement. The 
                                               
28 The term multi-level governance was first coined by Gary Marks (1993).  
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national government often possesses an informational advantage over the other national 
actors, and the opposition. The liberal intergovernmentalists hold that: 
EU integration can be best understood as a series of rational choices made by national 
leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the 
economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the 
international system, and the role of institutions is bolstering the credibility of interstate 
commitments. (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 18, cited in Wiener and Diez, 2004, pp. 78) 
 
The intergovernmentalist view is that the state is still in control of the decision-making 
processes in the EU. However, as the emphasis of this thesis is on cohesion policy 
decision-making that takes place in the national setting, I shall turn to assessing the 
nature of decision-making in cohesion policy and the Finnish decision-making system 
in particular. 
3.1.1. National variations in multi-level governance 
 
Cohesion policy is a special case when it comes to governance. Many scholars have 
argued that it is a typical example of multi-level governance. Peterson and Bomberg 
write:  
Advocates of MLG have argued that the way in which the structural funds are managed has 
led to a situation in which the autonomy of central governments is challenged by the 
Commission and by sub-national authorities. Decision-making competences in cohesion 
policy are more dispersed among national, supranational and sub-national levels than in 
others policy sectors. (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, pp. 165) 
 
Importantly, the concept of multi-level governance was first introduced in a study of 
European Community (EC) regional policy, and "has since been applied in relation to 
this policy area more than any other" (Bache, 2005, pp. 165). The fact that the theory 
was created from an analysis of EU regional policy is one of the main justifications for 
the use of MLG in this research. MLG is especially a theory of cohesion policy. 
 
However, despite the fact that MLG theory was first used to explain EU regional policy, 
there are considerable variations as to how well the concept in fact explains EU regional 
policy governance. Importantly, there is "considerable variation --- both across and 
within states" in the explanatory value of the concept (Bache, 2005, pp. 165). This is 
partly explained by the different levels of decentralisation in the EU member states. 
Kelleher (1999) writes that: 
The degree of decentralization --- occurring in the different member states inevitably 
shapes the relations between key actors within partnerships and determines competences 
and composition of partnerships. 
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If the political system is characterised by a high level of decentralisation, the diffusion 
of power to the local and regional levels, then the sub-national actors are likely to be 
more influential. The longer the subnational actors have possessed power and 
competences in various policy areas, such as taxation or health care, the more 
institutionalised their position is likely to be. They are also likely to possess the know-
how, expertise and resources needed to advance their interests in the context of 
partnerships. Consistent with this interpretation, Bache and Flinders (2005, pp. 168) 
contend that "where the EC/EU multi-level partnership model fitted well with domestic 
institutions and preferences it gave a push to multi-level governance". Therefore the 
more experience the sub-national level had on the use of power, the more likely it was 
that the new powers brought about by the principle of partnership were effectively put 
into operation. 
3.1.2. The Finnish System of Governance and MLG 
 
Rhodes argues that in cases of power struggle the central governments have usually 
managed to act as the „final gatekeepers‟ when the SNAs and the Commission have 
challenged their authority. The member states fight back, argue many scholars. Bache, 
George and Rhodes have written extensively on the topic. They remind that the member 
states will make every effort to stay in control of cohesion policy. (Bache, George and 
Rhodes 1996)  
 
In order to see how well the concept of multi-level governance can be applied to Finnish 
regional policy decision-making, one needs to get a grasp of the nature of the Finnish 
political system. Finland is a unitary state, yet highly decentralised. The local level has 
traditionally possessed extensive competencies in Finland. (Kull, 2008, pp. 106 and 
CEMR, n.d.) The powers of the local government in Finland are generally perceived to 
be among the highest in Europe. According to Ryynänen, the local level has "more 
functions and --- more authority" than the local level in other European countries. 
(Ryynänen, 2003, pp. 255, cited in Kull, 2008, pp. 106) In the picture below, we can 
identify the local, intermediate, and the national level. The municipalities are the 
powerful actors on the local level. In the intermediate level, the regional councils and 
the joint municipal boards represent the local government. The AVIs (Regional State 
Administrative Agencies) and the ELYs (Centres for Economic Development, 
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Transport and the Environment) represent the state in the regional, or intermediate, 
level. The ministries are strongly represented in the central level. The key actors in 
Finnish EU regional policy are the regional councils. They are composed of elected 
members of the municipalities of the region, and it is in their responsibility to prepare 
and execute the programmes co-financed by the structural funds.
29
 (CEMR, n.d.) In 
addition, the Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment 
(elinkeino-, liikenne- ja ympäristökeskus), of which there are fifteen, are in charge of 
regional development through the implementation and development of government 
activities in the regions. In other words, they are the governments „arm‟ in the local 
level. (CEMR, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 2: Public Administration in Finland 
 
 
(The picture originally from Linkola, T. and Virtanen, J. (2005), cited in a modified form in: The 
Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, 2011) 
 
Following this, and taking into account Bache and Flinders' (2005) argument that 
"where the EC/EU multi-level partnership model fitted well with domestic institutions 
and preferences it gave a push to multi-level governance", one could expect the local 
level to have been more "ready" for the partnership principle than the local level was in 
other more centralised states, for example. Interestingly, Kull writes that this 
transformation was not easy in Finland due to the relative weakness of the regional 
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 The regional councils are also in charge of regional development policy, and regional planning. The 
municipal politicians, who have been directly elected, are appointed to the regional councils. They 
represent the municipality in the council. 
  
  
Ministries 
Central 
Offices 
Regional Councils 
Joint Municipal 
Boards 
AVIs and ELYs 
Intermediate 
state 
administration 
State local 
administration 
Municipalities 
CENTRAL  
    
ADMINISTRATIO
N 
  STATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
INTERMEDIATE 
    LEVEL 
LOCAL LEVEL 
   29 
level. Kull (2008, pp. 106) writes that the level between the local and the central level is 
"seemingly highly fragmented in Finland". The regional institutions were weak or they 
did not even exist when Finland joined the EU, and started receiving structural funding. 
EU integration and the administration of EU policies, especially EU Regional Policy --- 
forced the construction of new, meso-level institutions. Regional Councils and other inter-
municipal forms of cooperation have been set up in Finland to implement EU policies. 
(Kull, 2008, pp. 106) 
 
The weakness of the regional level at the start of Finland's membership to the EU 
suggests that the Finnish regional authorities were indeed not 'ready' for regional policy-
making, and therefore we can expect the level of multi-level governance to be lower 
than it was in member states with an already powerful regional level.  Following this, 
Kull argues, the central state administration is the most powerful actor, "especially as 
far as the implementation of the Structural Funds is concerned" (Kull, 2008, pp. 111). 
Pekka Kettunen found in his study that the implementation of the structural fund 
programmes is "strongly dominated by the state ministries, especially those of the 
Interior, Education, Trade and Industry, Agriculture and Employment". According to 
Kull, Kettunen "draws a sad picture of regional and other sub-national actors in EU 
sponsored Regional Policy doing no more than ratify what has been served up on a plate 
by the central level." (Kettunen, 2005, pp. 369, cited in Kull, 2008, pp. 112). According 
to Kull, many scholars have concluded that there is no independent administrative 
meso-level in Finland. The same message was heard in the Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities‟ Report on Regional Democracy in Finland. The rapporteur, Josef 
Leinen, concluded that: 
As regards the territorial structure of power in Finland at regional level, the Rapporteur 
agrees with the opinion of government officials that the present stage of regional 
government does not represent genuine regions (Leinen, 1999, cited in Kull, 2008, pp. 112) 
 
Nevertheless, some scholars are not as sceptical of the regions‟ relative position in EU 
structural fund policy. Mäenpää concluded in his study that the regional level has been 
strengthened, although Mäenpää too admits that the regional councils‟ role is at the 
moment only to act as a distributor of the Structural Funds. (Mäenpää, 1997, pp. 11, 
cited in Kull, 2008, pp. 112) Nevertheless, one can expect that the local and regional 
level was not as „ready‟ for EU regional policy when Finland joined the Union, as the 
local and regional levels in more decentralised countries such as Germany or Spain. 
Due to the relatively strong position of the central government in EU regional policy in 
Finland, one can lead that the level of multi-level governance is not likely to be 
   30 
particularly high in Finland. We can thus argue that the Finnish system of governance 
creates conditions that are not particularly conducive for the emergence of true multi-
level governance. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the power of the local 
level, the municipalities. Whereas the regions and regional authorities are arguably 
relatively weak actors, the municipalities on the other hand are of great importance in 
Finnish politics. However, as the municipalities are not in a central position in EU 
regional policy-making, we can expect the Finnish state to be, echoing Bache, George 
and Rhodes, the „final gatekeeper‟ in Finnish EU Structural Fund policy-making. 
 
In sum, the conditions have not been most conducive to the emergence of MLG in 
Finland. The central state is still the most powerful actor. However, as the next section 
indicates, the state is not the only player in cohesion policy. 
3.2. Policy Networks Approach 
 
Below I discuss the policy networks approach, which forms a part of the theoretical 
foundation for this paper. According to Tanja Börzel, a policy network is: 
A set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent 
nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and 
who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that cooperation is 
the best way to achieve these common goals. (Börzel 1998, pp. 254) 
 
John Peterson argues that policy network analysis can be applied to study how EU 
policy is shaped. (Peterson 2004, pp. 124) The policy network theory has many strands 
and there are many different policy network models. The most well known is the 
Rhodes model of policy networks. (Peterson, 2004, pp. 120) The Rhodes model, 
crucially, is compatible with other policy network models. Most importantly, it is 
compatible with the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) model applied in this thesis. 
(Peterson, 2004, pp. 121) In other words, both the Rhodes model and the ACF model 
both fall under the heading 'Policy network theory'. They are similar in their 
presumptions about the nature of policy networks and the nature of governance, but 
differ in how they approach the analysis of these networks. The Rhodes model is a more 
formal analysis of the nature of the policy networks. It focuses on issues such as the 
stability of the network, how the network is organised and what kind of resource 
dependencies exist between the members of the network. (Rhodes, 1997) Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith‟s model, on the contrary, focuses less on the formal side of things and 
more on the belief systems of the different actors, the informal contacts between the 
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members and the 'behind the scenes' activity that may in the long run result in policy 
changes. The ACF model endeavours to identify groups of like-minded actors who act 
together over long periods of time. However, as the Rhodes model "has probably been 
employed more often than any other in the study of EU governance", (Peterson, 2004, 
pp. 120) I shall thus refer to it to explain policy network theory on a general level. 
 
Policy network analysis is particularly fruitful when applied to the study of EU 
governance. Whereas traditional political theories may have trouble explaining the 
realities, the policy networks approach can be used to analyse EU politics despite the 
complexity of decision-making and the fact that “decision-rules and dominant actors 
vary between policy sectors”, and despite the great diversity of actors and the lack of 
hierarchy in the decision-making system. (Peterson 2004, pp. 117–118) Indeed, 
Peterson suggests that “arguably, policy network analysis is never more powerful an 
analytical tool than when it is deployed at the EU level.” (Peterson 2004, pp. 119) 
 
Peterson argues that “the application of policy network analysis to the EU is a product 
of the widely shared view that the European Union is not an ordinary „garden variety‟ 
IO [intergovernmental organisation], but rather a system of governance in its own 
right.” (Peterson 2004, pp. 122) In other words, the EU political system should be 
analysed as a sui generis. He claims that policy networks analysis suits the analysis of 
EU governance:  
“What is clear is that EU governance occurs simultaneously at multiple levels of 
government, thus giving rise to „multi-level governance‟ (MLG) as a descriptive term for 
what the EU offers. In theory, and at least sometimes in practise, power is distributed 
between the EU, national, regional, and local levels according to the principle of 
subsidiarity: that is, the Union as a whole legislates only in areas---where policy problems 
cannot be solved at lower levels of government.” (Peterson 2004, pp. 126)  
 
As it has been argued, many scholars have questioned the idea that the EU system of 
governance would have led to the erosion of the power of national governments as 
power and decision-making authority have been spread to various levels of government 
and is shared between public and private actors. However, the MLG theory was created 
to explain the realities in EU regional policy in the first place. EU regional policy, more 
than other EU policy areas, was indeed special due to the important role given to the 
SNAs and private actors as a result of the partnership principle. Hence one cannot 
completely dismiss the idea that cohesion policy is a form of MLG. Peterson argues: 
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“MLG is clearly far more prominent in some policy sectors – above all, cohesion 
policy”. (Peterson 2004, pp. 126) 
 
The policy networks approach has often been applied to the study of EU regional 
policy. All the EU, national, and subnational level actors are connected to each other in 
the work of regional policy: “To portray the EU as a multi-level system of governance 
is to assume that actors representing different levels of government are interdependent. 
They thus network with each other to design, implement, and enforce EU rules.” One of 
the essential features of the approach is the assumption that the actors are 
interdependent. Peterson writes that the “EU may seem enormously powerful. Yet, it is 
extraordinarily weak in terms of resources, and relies heavily on assets and expertise 
located in the national capitals or the private sector.”30 (Peterson 2004, pp. 119)  
 
In regional policy, the sub-national and private actors are important providers of 
expertise and know-how on how the structural funds should be managed. As the name 
suggests, policy network analysis takes the form, shape and structures of networks as 
the starting point for analysis: “the way in which networks are structured in any EU 
policy sector will determine, and thus help explain and predict, policy outcomes.” 
(Peterson 2004, pp. 118–119) This thesis examines the policy networks that are active 
in the context of EU regional networks in Finland. Through policy networks analysis 
one can examine the networks that endeavour to „design, implement, and enforce EU 
rules‟ and thus better understand how EU regional policy is created. There can be 
several policy networks within the same policy subsystem. (Börzel 1998) 
3.2.1. The policy networks approach and regional policy 
 
As it has been written above, EU regional policy is based on four principles. The most 
important of these principles, when it comes to assessing the suitability of policy 
networks approach to the analysis of the topic of this thesis, is the partnership principle. 
(Peterson and Bomberg, 1999) Indeed, it could be argued that the partnership principle 
is the main justification for the use of policy networks theory. (See Hooghe, L. 1996 
and Benz, A. 1988) The principle is crucial because it establishes the official role of the 
sub-national and non-state, private actors, in the decision-making process, giving them 
                                               
30 Here one might also add the local, regional, and European level actors on which the EU relies on in 
regional policy decision-making. 
   33 
the possibility to shape EU regional policy. This is in line with Rhodes' model of policy 
networks, which assumes that "policy networks are more likely to occur when the 
Commission depends on other actors for implementing its policy." (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 
161) It could be argued that cohesion policy is such a policy: the Commission is 
dependent on the information and expertise located in the national capitals, in the 
regions, possessed by both public and private actors and the partners. Rhodes argues 
that policy networks are likely to occur in situations like this, "when the institutional 
fragmentation of multi-level governance characterizes the policy sector, when the policy 
is complex, and when the Commission needs [the other actors'] information and 
expertise." (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 160) Cohesion policy fulfils these criteria. Therefore one 
can expect the cohesion policy setting to give rise to policy networks. 
 
The policy networks approach can be applied to the study of cohesion policy because in 
cohesion policy the sub-national and non-state actors are not only involved in 
implementation of policy but also take part in policy shaping and formulation. This is 
not the case in all areas of EU policy-making. Sub-national actors normally have a 
smaller role in the decision-making process in other areas of EU policy-making. The 
multi-level governance philosophy behind the policy networks approach is often 
opposed on the basis that the policy networks are only able to influence how the 
government-set policies are implemented. (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, pp. 166) 
Crucially, however, in cohesion policy the non-state and sub-national actors also take 
part in the shaping and formulation of cohesion policy: “whereas most policy sectors are 
characterised by a relatively clear demarcation between formulation and 
implementation, this line is blurred in cohesion policy.” (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, 
pp. 166) This blurred division of decision-making authority in effect means that the 
government cannot simply dictate the terms of policy and force them on the other 
participants in the decision-making process. It must consult the partners. This, it could 
be argued, justifies the application of the policy networks approach to the study of EU 
cohesion policy. The non-state and subnational actors have a real role in cohesion 
policy. It may be that the governments are and will always be the final „gatekeepers‟ in 
this process. Nevertheless, as Peterson and Bomberg argue, 
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To sideline as „mere implementation‟ the actions of networks is to miss their role as policy 
shapers. Policy networks are involved in the implementation (actual spending of funds) and 
monitoring on the ground, but they are also involved in decisions prior to implementation, 
such as shaping the structural funds regulations and drawing up development programmes. 
(Peterson and Bomberg 1999, pp. 166–167) 
 
In other words, one can argue that policy networks analysis is an appropriate tool for 
analysing EU cohesion policy as cohesion policy is characterised by multi-level 
governance, the relative complexity of decision-making, and the Commission‟s 
dependence on the other actors for information and expertise, as well as the distribution 
of powers to various levels of government. Given that the regional policy networks can 
take part in the implementation and formulation of regional policy, they arguably have a 
real chance to shape the policy. This thesis examines how these actors endeavour to do 
this. 
Governments remain ultimately responsible for governance, but that is not the whole story. 
Before policies are „set‟ by elected political actors, policy choices are shaped and refined in 
bargaining between a diverse range of actors, including some who are non-governmental, 
all of whom have an interest in what policy is chosen. Policy networks can narrow options 
and shift the agenda by pursuing „strategies that generate new political and economic 
forces‟. (Thatcher 1998, pp. 406, cited in Peterson, 2004, pp. 119) 
 
In sum, then, every policy sector is characterised by different dynamics and power 
relationships between the actors involved. One cannot assume that the same power 
relationships that exist in, say, EU agricultural policy, would exist in EU regional 
policy, or that the leverage enjoyed by the government over regional actors in social 
policy would be on the same level in EU regional policy. Therefore every policy sector 
is different, and the dynamic varies between different EU countries. Furthermore, 
despite the fact the government more often than not has the final word, the government 
cannot be considered to be acting completely independently of partners (the local, 
regional, private sector and EU-level actors) involved in the policy process. The 
government, as Peterson argues, is dependent on the other players in producing policy. 
Often the policies are produced through the coordination of various actors policy 
positions. Above all, the different actors that operate in the policy network have 
informal influence on policy. Even though the government may make the final decision 
on the type of policy chosen, the actors may have an influence on what kind of 
alternatives the government chooses the policy from. This, one could argue, is the real 
source of power for the non-state, sub-national and private actors. 
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3.2.2. Partnership principle and policy networks theory 
 
Policy networks analysis has been applied to the study of cohesion policy many a times. 
One of the key justifications for this has been the introduction in 1988 of the 
„partnership principle‟. (See Hooghe 1996 or Benz 1988.) The partnership principle was 
introduced with the 1988 reform of cohesion policy. Rhodes (1997) writes that "Article 
4(1) of the 1988 structural fund regulations defined partnership --- as: 'close 
consultation between the Commission, the member states concerned and the competent 
authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local and other level, with each 
party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal' ". (Council reg. 2052/88. Official 
Journal L185/9, 15 July 1988, cited in Rhodes, 1997, pp. 147) The partnership principle 
thus cemented a formal role to the partners in the making of EU regional policy. In 
practise this meant that all the above-mentioned partners would take part in "preparing 
regional plans for expenditure; negotiation of the Community Support Frameworks; 
implementation of the operational programmes; and monitoring and assessing the 
measures taken." (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 147) In essence, the principle laid the foundations 
for the dependency of the Commission on the partners, and, crucially, the dependence of 
the national government on the sub-state, regional and local level actors and, all in all, 
the horizontal nature of decision-making in regional policy. The partners were now, at 
least on paper, policy-shapers. Albeit that the national government still often has the 
final word, the partnership principle ensured that the national government cannot simply 
ignore what the other partners have to say. As it has been argued, policy networks are 
likely to emerge "when the Commission depends on other actors for implementing its 
policy." (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 161) The partnership principle thus created conducive 
conditions for new policy networks to emerge.  
 
A policy network consists of actors at all levels of EU governance. A typical cohesion 
policy network can include Commission officials, sub-national authorities‟ (SNAs) 
representatives, national civil servants at the EU level, members of the European 
parliament, interest groups and “private actors involved in the „partnership‟ 
programmes.” (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999, pp. 163) Despite their diversity, these 
actors share common interests. They “exchange resources to pursue these shared 
interests acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve these common 
goals”. (Börzel 1998, pp. 254) What is crucial as regards the policy networks is that the 
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actors may have more influence on the policy process than what their official role 
would suggest. Peterson and Bomberg argue that “actors which may pull little 
institutional weight---can play a more meaningful role within networks.” (Peterson and 
Bomberg, 1999, pp. 163–164) They mention the Committee of the Regions as such a 
case: “For instance, despite the CoR‟s institutional weakness, its members and staff are 
potentially important members of EU policy networks. Many possess the valued 
resources of legitimacy, information and contacts.” (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999, pp. 
164) In other words, even though an actor is not in an official position to influence the 
contents of EU regional policy, the actor may nevertheless, through informal contacts in 
the policy network, be able to influence the policy. It is crucial to take into account the 
possibility that “actors within cohesion networks shape policy behind the scenes.” 
(Peterson and Bomberg, 1999, pp. 164) If actors join forces to form what is referred to 
as would call 'advocacy coalitions', they can have a chance to influence policy. 
 
However, before one can carry out any meaningful analysis of policy-making, one must 
account for the concepts and tools, which one intends to apply to the analysis. Börzel, 
writing about the policy networks approach, argues that “there is a Babylonian variety 
of different understandings and applications of the policy network concept to be found 
in the study of policy-making both in the domestic and European context.” (Börzel 
1998, pp. 254) For this reason, this thesis takes as its starting point, and theoretical 
foundation, the ACF model created by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. 
3.3. Advocacy coalitions framework (ACF) model 
 
In this section I introduce the theoretical model employed in this thesis. The ACF model 
has guided the research from the beginning. The ACF has directed the choice of 
research material, and helped in understanding the phenomena studied. All in all, the 
ACF has given direction to my work in all stages of the research. I would not have 
interpreted the political phenomena examined in the same way without the ACF model. 
I cannot thus claim independence from the theoretical assumptions set out in the ACF 
model. The ACF has been a central guiding instrument in my work. It has been the tool 
with which I have produced this thesis. 
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According to the ACF model, successful groups of actors, or advocacy coalitions 
(ACs), may shift the EU‟s policy agenda. According to Sabatier, advocacy coalitions 
are groups 
composed of actors from various governmental and private organizations who both a) share 
a set of normative and causal beliefs and b) engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated 
activity over time. (Sabatier 1998, pp. 103) 
 
Advocacy coalitions are also policy networks. Peterson and Bomberg write about 
regional policy networks that "spring up around specific projects or objectives". These 
policy networks, they argue, "are likely to be truly tri-level, involving (and often led by) 
Commission officials, and individual state executives alongside country-specific sub-
national actors." (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999, pp. 164) According to Sabatier, an 
advocacy coalition‟s members are united above all by their objectives concerning a 
specific policy. Whereas other policy networks may be united by other factors, such as 
their official position or their expertise
31
, advocacy networks are “overtly political 
networks consisting of various kinds of policy activist, including public officials 
representing multiple levels of government, who „share a particular belief system‟ and 
work together over relatively long periods of time (ten years or more) to force policy 
change.” (Peterson 2004, pp. 121) The members of an advocacy coalition can be a 
colourful group of people. As their main 'bond' is not professional, nor is it expertise, 
the members of an AC can indeed come from many different walks of life. Sabatier, 
who developed the advocacy coalitions model with Jenkins-Smith, writes that these 
ACs are a varied group of actors, who nevertheless have something in common. 
The ACF explicitly argues that most coalitions will include not only interest group leaders, 
but also agency officials, legislators from multiple levels of government, applied 
researchers, and perhaps even a few journalists. (Sabatier 1998, pp. 103) 
 
Members of an advocacy coalition share the same „belief system‟. By 'belief system' 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1998, pp. 99) mean the “value priorities, perceptions of 
important causal relationships --- and perceptions/assumptions concerning the efficacy 
of various policy instruments” that the advocacy coalition members share. In other 
words, the coalition members see the policy area in question similarly. They give the 
same importance to the same policy issues, they have the same understanding of the 
                                               
31 Epistemic communities, which are also policy networks, are united by their know-how and 
professionalism in a given area. According to Haas (1992, pp.3) "an epistemic community is a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim 
to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area." They are experts in their field, and this 
status of expertise is what unites them or brings them together. 
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cause and effect of policies, and policy instruments, and they also think similarly about 
the possible solutions to policy problems.  
 
In sum, advocacy coalitions are networks of actors that are united by a „common cause‟. 
What unites them is that they share the same view about a particular (political) issue. 
For example, they might agree that a piece of environmental legislation should be 
changed. Or, as in the study by Elliot and Schlaepfer (2001), the model was applied to 
"the development of a forest certification programme in Sweden, in which the main 
actors were large forest companies, private forest owners and non-governmental 
conservation organizations." Elliot and Schlaepfer found two coalitions. The first 
coalition was united by similar attitudes to property rights and their support for timber 
production. The second coalition was united above all their shared recognition for the 
need for environmental protection. (Elliot and Schlaepfer, 2001) The two advocacy 
coalitions were diverse policy networks, as they involved NGOs, forest companies, 
labour unions and Sami people. One might think that these different groups would not 
have anything to do with each other, but as the ACF model assumes, they were united 
by a common cause, not because they knew each other, or because they shared similar 
expertise. 
 
When thinking about politics and policy, the AC „members‟ are above all united by 
what Sabatier calls their „policy core beliefs‟. This is the key part of the advocacy 
coalition framework model. The policy core beliefs are the coalition‟s members‟  
“basic perceptions concerning the general seriousness of the problem and its principal 
causes --- and strategies for realizing core values within the subsystem, such as --- the level 
of government best suited to deal with the problem, and the basic policy instruments to be 
used.” (Sabatier 1998, pp. 103)  
 
For example, the advocacy coalition members might all share the view that the control 
over the EU regional development programmes should be transferred entirely to the 
national level instead of the regional level where it is now to enable effective regional 
policy.
32
 In other words, the AC members would all share the view that the regional 
handling of the programmes is the „principal cause‟ of the problem, and leads to 
ineffective results. Thus the issue of where and at what level to design and handle the 
regional development programmes would be the factors that unites the members of the 
                                               
32
 As seen in the findings, this turned out to be the major factor dividing the policy actors into different 
coalitions in this study. 
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coalition. Or, alternatively, the coalition members might all share the view that the EU‟s 
approach to structural policy does not well enough take into account the cold climate in 
Finland, which creates specific infrastructural needs. The coalition‟s members would all 
share the same view on the solutions to the problem. For example, they could all 
advocate for new criteria for the allocation of funding that would take the harsh climate 
into account in the distribution of the funds. In other words, the AC‟s members‟ concern 
over a particular policy keeps the AC‟s members together. Sabatier calls the policy core 
beliefs the “fundamental „glue‟ of the coalitions”. (Sabatier 1998, pp. 103) In other 
words, the actors might not otherwise even know each other, but they are united by their 
beliefs about a particular political issue.  
3.3.1. Advocacy coalition strategies 
 
As it has been established above, the ACs are united in their beliefs about a particular 
political problem. Furthermore, the AC is also united by their response to that political 
problem. Sabatier argues that “each coalition adopts one or more strategies --- as a 
means of altering the behavior of various governmental institutions in an effort to 
realize its policy objectives." (Sabatier 1998, pp. 104) The AC advocates for a particular 
solution to a policy problem. However, the ACF model has been criticised for falsely 
assuming that when actors in an advocacy coalition share the same policy objectives, 
they would also act together in order to influence the policy accordingly. (Schlager, 
1995 and Schlager and Blomquist, 1996) In other words, two actors, who have similar 
interests regarding the content of the policy, 
do not necessarily act 
together to change the 
policy to what they 
would want it to be like. 
However, as this thesis 
does not analyse the end 
result of a policy 
process, but the process 
of influencing the 
content of this policy, 
the validity of this 
Figure 3: Advocacy coalition framework 
model (Sabatier 1998, pp. 102) 
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critique of the ACF relating to problems of collective action cannot be assessed. 
 
Here we turn to the actual process of influencing policy. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
have created a detailed model of the ACF. On the previous page is a picture of how the 
ACF works. As Sabatier argues, there are often many coalitions within the policy 
networks that attempt to shape policy. In the picture of the model we can identify 
coalitions A and B. These two groups of policy actors lobby for a certain policy 
outcome. They have adopted a certain strategy for attaining that outcome, based on the 
constraints and resources that the relatively stable parameters and the external system 
events form. For example, if the economy is in a good shape, the actors are more likely 
to advocate for bigger increases in budgets. However, if the country has recently 
experienced an economic downturn (External system events / „1.Changes in socio-
economic conditions‟), the actors are constrained by this factor and must therefore adapt 
their policy strategy so that it takes into account the economic downturn. Consequently 
they are not as likely to advocate big increases in budgets, for example. Or alternatively, 
if the new government is EU-sceptic, (External system events / 3. Changes in systemic 
governing coalition) the coalitions need to take this into account when they form their 
policy strategies in EU matters, as this factor constrains the policy options available to 
them. Furthermore, if the actors have realised that the policy that was chosen in the 
previous negotiations is not working (policy output and policy impact), or it has 
undesirable effects, the coalitions may change their policy beliefs as a result. This is the 
„playing field‟ in which the AC‟s operate, attempting to have their own policy 
preferences included in the final policy decisions. 
3.3.2. Policy broker 
 
In order for the ACF model to work in the context of this study, the political decision-
making process needs to fit the 'parametres' of the ACF model. As seen in the picture 
(previous page) under the 'Policy subsystem' heading, the theory assumes the existence 
of a policy broker. 
Conflicting strategies from various coalitions are normally mediated by a third group of 
actors, here termed 'policy brokers', whose principal concern is to find some reasonable 
compromise that will reduce intense conflict. (Sabatier 1998, pp. 104) 
 
The policy broker mediates conflict, and tries to accommodate the differing policy 
objectives of the coalitions. (Sabatier, 1998) It could be argued that in the case of the 
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2014+ Working Group, the policy brokers are the members of the secretariat and the 
chairpersons of the 2014 + Working Group. The policy brokers act according to the 
principles of EU regional policy (Additionality, Partnership, Programming, and 
Concentration), ensuring that both the national and regional interests are taken into 
account. Therefore it would seem that the WG fulfils the ACF criteria for a suitable case 
to analyse. The ACF assumes that the policy brokers mediate between the conflicting 
interests of the various advocacy coalitions, in a neutral fashion. However, the model 
has been criticised for this assumption. Ingold and Varone (2012, pp. 1–4) argue that the 
ACF does not sufficiently well account for “strategic interest-based behavior” of policy 
brokers. They argue that in some situations the policy brokers may in fact have material 
interests, and may thus “enter the policy game” in order to seek rewards for themselves. 
In other words, the policy brokers may not always be neutral. Ingold and Varone (2012, 
pp. 4) argue: 
Policy brokers are rational actors: they mobilize and act strategically (to find a compromise 
between advocacy coalitions) because their brokerage activities allow them to realize their 
own interests. 
3.3.3. ACF model of the individual 
 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith write that the ACF model "clearly assumes that actors are 
instrumentally rational–that is, that they seek to use information and other resources to 
achieve their goals". However, they also write that "in processing information, the ACF 
assumes that actors suffer from a variety of cognitive biases and constraints [as] the 
actors' ability to process and analyze information is limited by time and computational 
constraints." (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, pp. 130)  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
use the model of the individual as an information processor whose data-digestion 
capabilities are limited as the basis for their one of their theories main assumptions: that 
the principal glue holding coalitions together are the policy core beliefs. The actors are 
likely to maintain the policy core beliefs despite new information that would encourage 
them to change their beliefs because they do not always have the capacity to process 
this new information and to adapt the new thinking (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 117). In other 
words, the ACF assumes that the individual is rational – but only to the extent that is 
enabled by the individual's personal capacity. This lends to the assumption that the 
coalition‟s beliefs are likely to stay the same despite some new information or 
arguments against the coalition‟s policy objectives. 
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3.3.4. Applicability of the ACF model to EU regional policy 
 
EU governance involves public and private actors on the local, regional, national and 
European level. The interaction between these actors at different levels varies greatly. 
Importantly, it is very hard to get a grasp of who is on whose side, who knows who and 
how well these actors coordinate their activities. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, pp. 
154) argue that one of the greatest innovations of the ACF model is the "concept of 
advocacy coalitions as a means of aggregating large numbers of actors from different 
institutions at multiple levels of government into a manageable number of units." The 
ACF model can therefore be applied to the study of EU regional policy despite the fact 
that the decision-making takes place on various levels and involves plenty of policy 
actors. In fact this setting is most suitable for an ACF analysis: Nohrstedt writes that the 
"ACF theory is originally founded on Sabatier‟s rejection of a focus upon single 
government institutions or single levels of government in favor of a meso-level 
approach to policy making (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, cited in Nohrstedt, 2009, 
pp. 328)." In other words, the ACF model is capable of capturing the necessary 
information even if the number of potentially influential actors, who need to be taken 
into account in the analysis, is high. 
 
The ACF model has been applied to a multitude of policy studies. Below I have listed 
only a few of the cases: 
 Poland's environmental policy 
 Environmental disputes 
 Airline deregulation 
 Environmental policy formulation in 
Brazil 
 Online censorship 
 EU steel policy 
 Waste policy 
 Elite sport policy 
 Nuclear power utilization 
 Offshore energy policy 
 Drug policy in Switzerland 
 Pharmacy policy in Denmark 
 Climate change policy in Canada 
 Tobacco policy 
 
 (Weible, Sabatier and McQueen, 2009) 
 
It could be argued that this list indicates that the model is fairly flexible in terms of the 
phenomena to the study of which it can be applied. It would seem that one could also 
apply the model to the study of EU regional policy networks. 
 
The European Union is often considered a sui generis political system, one that cannot 
be compared to any other political system. From this follows that the theories applied to 
the study of the EU must appreciate the uniqueness of the institution. Furthermore, 
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when studying a policy area as complex as regional policy, which is characterised by 
the above-mentioned decision-making arrangements where decision-making authority is 
spread to different levels of government (EU, national, regional, and local) and shared 
between the different actors (both public and private), the theory/model applied must be 
sensitive to these peculiarities. Indeed, as it has been argued by scholars in this chapter, 
traditional political theories and models are ill suited to such analysis.  
 
Some scholars have argued that it is difficult to apply the ACF model, which was 
created for analysing the policy-making process in the United States, to the study of 
other political systems. According to Nohrstedt, "critics argue that ACF theory falls 
short in explaining policy making in political systems outside the United States due to 
fundamental differences in institutional and political contexts” (Nohrstedt, 2009). 
However, the ACF has been applied to the study of EU governance in several instances. 
Sabatier, responding to criticism about the applicability of the ACF to other political 
systems outside the United States, argues that the ACF model "should apply well to the 
increasingly complex set of relationships evolving within the European Union". 
(Sabatier 1998, pp. 121) The ACF has successfully been applied to the study of EU 
policy processes. Sabatier writes that "several scholars have had no difficulty discerning 
coalitions composed of administrative agency officials, interest group leaders, and 
researchers from various countries forming, for example environmental or industry-
based coalitions in a variety of subsystems". (Sabatier 1998, pp. 121) (Peterson, 1995; 
Richardson, 1995; Richardson, 1996; Josselin, 1996 and Coen, 1997) Furthermore, 
ACF's attention to policy subsystems, of which Finnish EU regional policy decision-
making is an example, makes the model fruitful for studies of EU governance. (Sabatier 
1998, pp. 121) 
 
Another justification for the use of the ACF model to the analysis of the Finnish 
regional policy networks is the ACF's explicit "reliance upon the policy subsystem as 
the principal aggregate unit of analysis" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, pp. 154). In 
other words, the ACF model is well suited to analysing policy subsystems such as 
agricultural policy or, as in this thesis, cohesion policy.  
 
The ACF model has been used in a variety of ways. One of the ACF model's functions 
is to map out coalitions of actors, which are active in a certain policy field, such as 
   44 
agricultural or regional policy. Studies that have employed the ACF have tried to show 
which actors there are, what kinds of policy strategies they have as regards a specific 
policy, and how they rally their cause, and whether they have joined forces with other 
actors. A result of such studies has often been a rough mapping of these actors (a 
matrix) and their division into different coalitions. Normally researchers have not 
identified many coalitions. Sabatier writes: “Virtually all qualitative applications of the 
ACF have found one to three coalitions, with most perceiving two.” (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 
108) For example, the ACF was used in the analysis of the development of a forest 
certification programme in Sweden. Two coalitions were identified, the Forestry 
Coalition and the Environmental Coalition. Below is a short description of the 
membership of the coalitions, highlighting the policy priorities of the coalitions in this 
case study: 
The Forestry Coalition‟s normative beliefs included priority of timber production over 
environmental protection and strong support for private property rights. The Environmental 
Coalition accorded more importance to environmental protection and considered that 
private property rights should be subject to limitations if these would benefit the 
environment. (Elliot and Schlaepfer, 2001) 
 
The coalitions were united by: 
a) What they valued (timber production and property rights vs. 
environmental protection) and  
b) How these values were translated into policy goals in the development of 
the forest certification programme 
 
As it is argued below, the ACF model could be similarly applied to the study of EU 
regional policy. 
3.3.5. Conditions for applying the ACF model 
 
The ACF model is based on five basic premises. (Sabatier, 1998) This is the 
'philosophy' behind the model. 
1. Theories of policy process need to address the role that technical information concerning 
the magnitude and facets of the problem, its causes, and the probable impacts --- of various 
solutions play in that process. This is what the vast discussion among policy elites is about. 
 
2. Understanding the process of policy change – and the role of technical information 
therein – requires a time perspective of a decade or more. 
 
3. The most useful unit of analysis for understanding the overall policy process in modern 
industrial societies is not any specific governmental organization or program but rather a 
policy subsystem or domain. 
 
4. In virtually all domains, policy subsystems involve actors from several levels of 
government within a country and, increasingly, from international organizations and other 
countries. 
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5. Public policies / programs incorporate implicit theories about how to achieve their 
objectives --- and thus can be conceptualized in much the same way as belief systems. They 
involve value priorities, perceptions of important causal relationships, perceptions of world 
states (including the magnitude of the problem), and perceptions/assumptions concerning 
the efficacy of various policy instruments. (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 99) 
 
The first premise invites us to pay attention to the detail. The premise links technical 
information with the way the coalitions are built. Members of the same advocacy 
coalition share the same 'problem definition', which is also their belief system. In other 
words, they see the same problems, and the same solutions to these problems. They also 
share the same view about what the future should hold as regards the policy in question. 
 
The ACF favours a relatively long time perspective. The second premise entails that the 
members of the advocacy coalition need to have known each other for at least ten years 
before they can be said to have had the necessary time to form and start advocating a 
specific policy. In other words, advocacy coalitions take time to develop. This is 
probably explained by the fact that as the systems of governance are complex and 
involve many levels, it takes time for a certain "problem definition"/policy strategy to 
travel to all the levels of the decision-making machinery. The requirement that the AC 
members are to have known each other for at least ten years may pose challenges to this 
research. It may be that the members of the Working Group for the Preparation of the 
Structural Fund Programme Period 2014–2020 have not known each other for ten years. 
This aspect is addressed in the analysis section. 
 
The third premise is related to the type of system of governance to the analysis of which 
the ACF model is normally applied. As the policy process is not contained to a single 
level of government, one should not therefore narrow the analysis to only one 
governmental programme or the work of a single ministry, for example. The underlying 
assumption of the ACF is that there are more influential actors in the modern political 
space than traditional political theories would be willing to admit. Consequently, one 
cannot limit the analysis to a narrow section of the political space without the risk of 
omitting important actors from the analysis. Therefore the ACF is at its best when it is 
applied to a policy subsystem, such as energy policy, or environmental policy, or, as in 
this study, to EU regional policy. 
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The fourth premise is linked to the third premise. It underlines the importance of a 
broad analysis. The levels that should be included in the subsystem studied are not only 
the local, regional, national and EU-level, but also the international level, and the 
political space in other countries. Sabatier seems to recommend that one should not 
narrow the analysis to the national context if one is to apply the ACF. The fourth 
premise presents a challenge to the approach taken in this thesis. As the thesis focuses 
on the work of a working group under the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 
the members of the group are all Finnish. The analysis thus omits the possibility of 
identifying international and foreign actors who would belong to the same coalition as 
some members of the Working Group for the Preparation of the Structural Fund 
Programme Period 2014–2020. There is in all likelihood a plentitude of actors who 
share the same policy objectives with members of the working group regarding the 
future of the structural funds. One can therefore say that the omission of international 
and foreign actors is a minor weakness in this thesis. However, there is a possibility that 
the interviews shed light on the international aspects of the policy networks. It is 
possible that the individuals interviewed clearly identify themselves to be in the same 
coalition with international actors, who are not members of the working group. 
 
The fifth premise emphasises the importance of the content of public policies and the 
programs. The premise implies that there is no such thing as impartial policy. The 
argument goes that public policies and policy programs contain, and are based on, a 
particular view of the world, and a particular belief system, which certain coalitions 
possess. They reflect the world of the actors who were successful in getting their ideas 
through to the final version of the policy. One could argue that the fifth premise in a 
way puts forward the idea that public policies in fact represent the cemented belief 
systems of the winners of the policy process.  
 
Having discussed the premises of the ACF model, I now turn to the hypotheses the 
model makes about advocacy coalitions, policy change, and policy learning. Their 
relevance is also briefly discussed in the findings. 
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The hypotheses the ACF model makes about advocacy coalitions are:
33
 
Hypothesis 1: On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs 
are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be stable over periods of a decade 
or so. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on 
issues pertaining to the policy core, although less so on secondary aspects. 
 
Hypothesis 3: An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of his (its) belief 
system before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core. 
 (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 106) 
 
The hypotheses concerning policy change the ACF makes are: 
Hypothesis 4 (revised in 1993): The policy core attributes of a governmental program in a 
specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy 
coalition that instituted the program remains in power within that jurisdiction – except 
when the change is imposed by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (1997): Significant perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g. changes in 
socio-economic conditions, public opinion, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy 
outputs from other subsystems) are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the 
policy core attributes of a governmental program. 
(Sabatier, 1998, pp. 106) 
 
Hypotheses concerning policy learning, particularly across coalitions: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is a 
forum which is: 
 
(a) Prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate; and  
 
(b) Dominated by professional norms.  
 (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 106) 
 
Below I briefly discuss these hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that if there is a major dispute regarding the core content of the 
policy, the actors active are likely to "retreat to their bunkers", and side with the 
members of their own coalition. It also takes into account the time perspective, stating 
that the groupings are likely to persist over longer periods. 
 
Hypothesis 2 discusses the level of cohesiveness within the coalitions. The hypothesis 
states that when it comes to the factor "gluing" coalitions together, the policy core 
aspects, the coalition is identified by the unitary position of the actors within the 
coalition on the policy core. In other words, all the coalition members share the same 
policy core beliefs, even though they may disagree on some other, less important details 
of the policy. 
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 The rest of the hypotheses can be found in Sabatier, 1998. 
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Hypothesis 3 discusses the "stubbornness" of the policy actors. It practically states that 
even though the policy actors may change their opinion regarding some, less important 
details of the desired policy, they are highly unlikely to change their opinion regarding 
the crucial aspects of the desired policy. In other words, a 2014+ Working Group 
member could for example have acknowledged that he/she has been 'wrong' about 
“policy preferences regarding desirable regulations or budgetary allocations, the design 
of specific institutions” (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 104), such as some details of the 
regulations for the structural funds (such as the definitions in the regulations regarding 
what constitutes "retraining" or "structural unemployment"), about some details of the 
Structural Fund institutions (like Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the 
Environment), or how the structural funds should be distributed between the ESF and 
the ERDF
34
. However, the members would not easily acknowledge that their stand on 
the heart of the matter, on the most crucial aspects of the policy, should be changed. 
These beliefs are, if not religious-like, at least rigid. Therefore, the actors do not easily 
alter their stand on the core aspects of their policy beliefs. The core aspects could 
include the actors' stance on where (at which level of government) the Structural Funds 
programmes should be managed and controlled. They could also involve a firm opinion 
of the role of the central government in the process, and related to this, the role of the 
regions and the rightful division of labour between the local, regional, and national 
level. 
 
Hypothesis 4 is interesting because of the multi-level governance aspect of EU regional 
policy. The 2014+ Working Group does not independently draw the terms of the 
investment priorities set out in the Partnership Contract, but has to choose the priorities 
from a set of predetermined priorities designed by the European Commission. 
Hypothesis 4 states that the policy core attributes of a governmental program can 
change if "change is imposed by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction". It could be 
argued that the Europe 2020 Strategy fills this description. It is designed by the 
European Commission and imposed on the member states, limiting the options available 
to the member states in choosing the policy priorities for the Partnership Contract. The 
European Commission is a superior institution to the 2014+ Working Group, and the 
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 The ESF and the ERDF complement each other. 
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Working Group cannot oppose the Europe 2020 Strategy's priorities. The interviews test 
whether this is the case. 
 
Hypothesis 5 also discusses the likelihood of policy change. It states that "significant" 
changes that affect the policy subsystem can create conditions, which are conducive to 
policy change. One should emphasise the importance of the word "significant". As EU 
regional policy is an EU-wide policy, the external system events (changes) should be 
considerable. Thus one cannot think that local changes in socio-economic conditions 
(such as the closure of factories in a certain region), public opinion, or coalitions would 
change the policy program. However, the current economic crisis that started in 2008 
could arguably be treated as one such "significant" change in the external system. 
However, changes in the external system events only increase the possibility of change. 
Therefore even a change of government in Finland does not necessarily translate into 
policy change, as government representatives are not the only members of the Working 
Group. Furthermore, the representatives of the ministries, even though they officially 
represent the government's views, also represent their ministries, and the ministries may 
have differing interests regarding the content of policy priorities when compared to the 
policy interests of the current government. The interviews contain an element of testing 
whether the 2014+ Working Group's members perceive of any "significant 
perturbations external to the subsystem", which would have dramatically altered the 
conditions for policy options available, increasing the likelihood of policy change. 
 
Hypothesis 9 was crucial to this thesis‟ choice of empirical material. It deals with 
situations where the actors are likely to change their opinion on the desired content of 
the policy. The hypothesis states that the actors are most likely to consider changing 
their opinions on the desired policy when they participate in an official, recognised 
forum where the policy is discussed. The forum has to be "prestigious enough to force 
professionals from different coalitions to participate". In other words, the legitimacy of 
the forum has to be sufficiently high, and the policy actors "need" to participate in it. 
Sabatier does not elaborate on what he means by "forcing", but we can assume that the 
forum is of such importance to the actors that the decision not to participate would harm 
the actor's interests. In other words, the policy actor wants to be there when the policy 
content is discussed. Another condition that Sabatier specifies is the professionalism of 
the working culture of the forum. The forum is not an ad hoc get-together where the 
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loudest voices dominate, but a place for real policy contemplation and constructive 
elaboration on the content of the policy. Importantly, it could be argued that the 2014+ 
Working Group fulfils these criteria. 
 
The highly important position of the group in drawing out the proposal establishing the 
content of Finnish EU cohesion policy priorities surely encourages the policy actors, 
who are members of the group, to participate in the meetings of the Working Group, 
and to watch for their interests. Absence from the meetings of the 2014+ Working 
Group is not an option. Therefore, one can safely conclude that the Working Group 
fulfils the criteria of a policy forum. From this we can lead that the members' 
participation to the 2014+ Working Group's work increases the likelihood of policy 
learning. The members of the group can learn from each other, and alter their own 
policy beliefs. This is further confirmed by the fact that the decision establishing the 
Working Group clearly states: "the Working Group has acted as an active discussion 
forum and channel for the exchange of information for the participants". The fact that 
the Working Group can be said to represent what Sabatier calls a policy "forum" lends 
justification to the choice of the members of the working group for the interviewees. 
 
Importantly, the ACF model does not assume that policy change is commonplace. This 
is particularly the case with the 'heart' of the policy, the policy core. Sabatier (1998) 
writes: "changes in the policy core of governmental programs are infrequent events". 
Hypotheses four, five and nine therefore only describe the variables that increase the 
possibility of policy change, but do not self-evidently lead to it. The hypotheses describe 
the conditions that create a 'window of opportunity' for the change of policy. The so-
called 'minority coalition'
35
 can then make the use of this opportunity to advocate for a 
change of policy. (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 118). 
 
Furthermore, it is just as important to note that the 2014+ Working Group is not the 
only arena, through which the policy actors endeavour to influence the content of EU 
regional policy. The Working Group is just one of the policy venues available. Sabatier 
writes that the actors "have a multitude of possible venues, including agencies, courts, 
and legislatures at all levels of government"(Sabatier, 1998, pp. 117) where to influence 
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 The coalition, which is not the dominating coalition within the policy network. 
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the policy‟s content. Given the multi-level governance system found in EU regional 
policy, the policy actors are likely to be active at the EU level through lobbying efforts, 
in other member states with other like-minded actors, and in different national 
institutions, such as the Finnish parliament Eduskunta, and in many other venues. This 
choosing of the channel through which the actors advocate their interests is often called 
'venue-shopping' (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 117). Thus one must admit that the subject matter 
of the thesis, the inner workings of the 2014+ Working Group, only touches the surface 
in the plentitude of possible policy venues, where the same actors are likely to be just as 
active in promoting their own interests.
36
 Nevertheless, given the importance of the 
2014+ Working Group in drawing the proposal for the Partnership Contract, one should 
also not underestimate the importance of this particular venue in the formation of EU 
regional policy in Finland. 
3.3.6. Organisational and individual self-interest 
 
Schlager and Blomquist have criticised the ACF for a failure to take into account the 
welfare of individuals and the organisations they represent in policy-making.
37
 
(Schlager and Blomquist 1996, pp. 661–4) It is surely important for all the actors in the 
policy subsystem that their financial situation is not worsened by policy choices made 
regarding the future share of the funds. Indeed, one could expect the actors to endeavour 
to increase their share of the funds available. This is surely the case in EU regional 
policy, where big sums of money move through the actors' organisations. Furthermore, 
many of the actors in fact exist to lobby for the interests of a specified interest group. 
The regional councils are a good example of group of actors, which advocate the 
interests of a specified clientele. They surely have an interest in (at least) maintaining or 
improving their position in relation to the other actors. Sabatier admits this weakness in 
the ACF model, when he writes that "by focusing on shared policy beliefs within a 
coalition, the ACF has neglected the interest that all individuals and organizations have 
in maintaining and increasing their own viability/welfare”. (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 116) In 
sum, also the financial motives of the actors need to be taken into account in the 
analysis. 
 
                                               
36
 Indeed, one of the interviewees implied that 90 % of the „lobbying‟ takes place outside the meetings of 
the working group. (Interview E, 2012)  
37
 Sabatier acknowledges this omission/failure in his article on the improved version of the ACF. See 
Sabatier, 1998, pp. 111. 
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To sum up, this chapter started with the theory of multi-level governance. MLG forms 
the theoretical background in this study. MLG theory is closely linked to policy 
networks analysis. Modern forms of governance are best analysed through theories and 
models that account for the dispersion of decision-making authority among several 
actors. The nation-state is not the only relevant policy actor, and many other policy 
actors take part in the shaping and formulation of policy through the informal policy 
networks. This chapter has demonstrated that despite a strong government presence in 
Finnish EU regional policy, sub-national, private, and local level actors matter. Policy 
networks analysis accounts for such changes in the nature of governance, and is thus 
suitable for studies of governance. The ACF model employed in this study is also a 
policy networks model, which pays particular attention to informal relationships 
between actors. It takes into account the ideological standpoints of the policy actors, the 
so-called „belief systems‟, and approaches the study of policy networks from this angle. 
As it has been argued in this chapter, the ACF suits the study of EU regional policy 
networks particularly well as it can aggregate a large group of actors and account for 
their policy interests and objectives. In a way, it can make sense of a rather complex 
phenomenon. It is therefore employed in this thesis. The next chapter discusses how the 
ACF model was applied in this study, and discusses the main findings. The ACF model 
is used to explain the findings. 
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4. Research method and findings 
4.1. Research method: Case study 
 
This thesis is a case study. It examines the formulation of Finnish EU regional policy 
priorities for the 2014–2020 structural fund programme period. According to Robert 
Yin (2009), a case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context". Yin writes that a case study is 
especially fitting in studies that ask the "how" and "why" questions. This could mean 
studies that examine, for example, how a policy is/was formulated, or why a certain 
policy was adopted. This thesis asks the "how" question, as it examines the process of 
policy creation. Importantly, this thesis does not ask why a certain type of policy was 
adopted. It is crucial to note that there is no final end product (a policy) to be analysed 
yet. The policy, which this thesis focuses on, is currently being drawn, and will only be 
finalised in 2013. This thesis examines the making of a policy, not the actual end result 
of that process.  
 
Case studies are often guided by theories on the policy process. Yin argues that the case 
study "benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis." (Yin, 2009, pp. 10–18) As it is discussed in the section on 
qualitative research, this thesis is strongly guided by a readymade theory on policy-
making. The collection of data and the analysis of the collected material are based on 
Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith's (Sabatier, 1998) advocacy coalition framework 
(ACF) model. This theoretical framework has guided all stages of the research.  
 
Case studies have often been criticised for not creating scientifically generalisable 
information. Why analyse single cases if the findings cannot be utilised to explain the 
world more generally? However, instead of making broad statistical generalisations 
about the world, the purpose of case studies is to offer analytical theories for 
understanding the world. Furthermore, the critics of case studies wrongly compare case 
studies to survey research, where "a sample is intended to generalize to a larger 
universe". (Yin, 2009, pp. 15 & 43) Case studies thus aim at a more thorough 
understanding of a specified set of phenomena through a profound analysis of a 
relatively narrow choice of research material. This is also called validity. On this basis, 
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this thesis aims to offer a theoretical explanation of the policy goals of EU regional 
policy actors, and why these actors advocate for these particular goals. This thesis seeks 
to understand this phenomenon in depth. 
4.1.1. Qualitative research 
 
Studies that apply a qualitative research approach often strive to improve our 
understanding of the research object. The qualitative approach is at its most fruitful 
when one seeks to understand fairly complex and relatively sensitive issues. Often, as it 
is also the case in this thesis, qualitative research is combined with in-depth 
interviewing. Usually qualitative studies produce detailed information on a rather 
specific topic. Importantly, it is much more difficult to generalise on the basis of the 
findings in qualitative research than it is in quantitative research. (University of 
Jyväskylä, 2011 and Web Center for Social Research Methods, 2006) It is often argued 
that “the detail in most qualitative research is both a blessing and a curse”. (Web Center 
for Social Research Methods, 2006) It is an advantage because one learns to know the 
research object in great detail. However, it is a disadvantage because it is rather 
challenging to make broader generalisations on the basis of the findings. Consequently 
it is unlikely that one could produce predictions for the future on the basis of the 
findings. Qualitative research therefore has to strike a balance between how detailed 
information one wants, and how well one wants the possible findings to be 
generalisable to other similar cases. If one examines a policy subsystem of a particular 
EU member state, as this thesis does, it is unlikely that the findings are generalisable to 
the other member states, as the differences in the political systems and political culture 
are likely to make the findings inapplicable to other countries. 
 
When it comes to the role of theory in qualitative research, there are three options for 
the use of theory. The researcher has to choose one of these alternatives, when starting 
the research. The alternatives are theory-based (deductive), theory-guided (abductive), 
and material-based (inductive) research. (Eskola, 2001, pp. 135–140, cited in Saaranen-
Kauppinen & Puusniekka, 2006) This thesis has adopted the deductive approach. 
  
   55 
4.1.2. Deductive research 
 
In deductive research, the phenomena are studied with the presumptions and 
assumptions of the chosen theory/model in mind. The theory or model, which guides 
the research and gives the research its „direction‟, shows the researcher what kind of 
phenomena to look for, and how to analyse the findings. The theory acts as the frame of 
reference for the researcher. According to Tuomi and Sarajärvi, deductive research 
starts from the general, and heads to the specific. Furthermore, it is often the purpose of 
the research to test the chosen model or theory in a new context. (Tuomi and Sarajärvi, 
2002, pp. 95–99, cited in Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka, 2006) 
 
This thesis applies the deductive approach. One of the goals of this thesis is to examine 
and assess how well a political theory on policy networks and policy-making, the ACF 
model, explains the phenomena it is intended to explain. The choice of research material 
has been guided by the ACF. The ACF model is applied to the study of regional policy 
networks in Finland, and more specifically, within the 2014+ Working Group. The 
phenomena are studied with the presumptions and assumptions of the ACF model in 
mind. Furthermore, this thesis discusses the relevance of the ACF model in explaining 
the nature of EU regional policy networks, and possibly provides suggestions for 
improving the model. 
4.1.3. Interview method 
 
The ACF model has been employed in a variety of studies.
38
 Indeed, it seems that the 
model is quite flexible, and can thus be applied to a great variety of policy studies 
ranging from EU steel policy to environmental policy. Weible, Sabatier and McQueen 
(2009, pp. 127) have carried out an extensive analysis on the application of the model in 
studies. They write that the most frequent method that has been used in studies, which 
used the ACF model in the period between 1987 and 2006, was the interview. In the 
studies they analysed, the interviews were often combined with content analysis. 
However, interviews have clearly been the method of choice for researchers applying 
the ACF model. Therefore it would seem that the choice of the interview method for a 
                                               
38
 For example, the ACF has been used in the study of domestic violence, Poland's environmental policy, 
environmental disputes, airline deregulation, environmental policy formulation in Brazil, online 
censorship, EU steel policy, waste policy, tobacco policy, elite sport policy and many more areas 
(Weible, Sabatier and McQueen, 2009). 
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study that applies the ACF model is well justified. Below I discuss the use of the 
interview method. 
 
When the issues examined cannot be answered simply or briefly, a qualitative interview 
might come in question. A qualitative interview, according to Rubin and Rubin (2005, 
pp. 4), is a conversation in which "a researcher gently guides a conversational partner in 
an extended discussion." Rubin and Rubin (2005, pp. 3) argue that a qualitative 
interview suits studies where the interviewees need to explain their answers or describe 
something in detail in order for the answer to be satisfactory. Simply put, the more 
complex and detailed answers are needed from the respondent, the likelier it is that one 
could use the qualitative interview method. Sometimes one cannot understand complex 
political issues without speaking to someone who works in the field studied. This is 
especially the case if the information required is not publically available. Johnson, 
Reynolds, and Joslyn (2001, pp. 272) argue that a qualitative interview is suitable to 
studies where one needs to know some kind of 'insider' information and understand the 
'insider' perspective.  
4.1.3.1. Advantages 
 
The interview as a method has many advantages. When comparing an interview to 
surveys, which are often considered by researchers as an alternative to interviewing, the 
interview has several advantages. According to Bailey, these are: 
1. Flexibility 
2. Response rate 
3. Nonverbal behaviour 
4. Control over environment 
5. Question order 
6. Spontaneity 
7. Respondent alone can answer 
8. Completeness 
9. Time of interview 
10. Greater complexity of questionnaire 
(Bailey, 1987, pp. 174–175) 
 
Bailey argues that in an interview, the researcher can better adapt to the interview 
situation. If one sends out a questionnaire, one can never be certain about in which kind 
of a situation the respondent answers the questions. On the second point, Bailey simply 
writes that many like talking more than writing, and are thus more willing to be 
interviewed instead of having to answer a long questionnaire in writing. Thirdly, Bailey 
argues, the researcher can make observations about the behaviour of the respondent 
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during the interview. This is an advantage as the researcher is able to estimate the 
validity of the interviewee's answers. Indeed, in a survey one cannot see how sincere the 
answers are, whereas in an interview one can indirectly see this from the interviewee's 
behaviour. One can also see things such as how the respondent reacts to questions or 
whether he/she is comfortable with the questions. However, it is a different question 
whether one can actually make any firm conclusions from observations of the 
respondent's behaviour. 
 
Fourthly, Bailey points out that in an interview the answers are certainly those of the 
interviewee. Fifthly he writes that the order of questions can be adapted if need be, thus 
allowing for a certain flexibility. The sixth point on Bailey's list is spontaneity. By this 
Bailey means that spontaneous answers are sometimes more informative as the 
interviewee does not have the time to produce a carefully structured answer or 'take 
back' an answer, unlike in the case of questionnaires.
39
 The seventh point implies that in 
an interview there is no possibility for cheating. The answers are thus original, and 
those of the interviewee. The eighth point on Bailey's list is completeness. By this 
Bailey means that the interviewer can, by means of repeating the same questions in 
alternative forms, ensure that the questions are dealt with thoroughly enough.
40
 This is 
not always possible in mailed questionnaires or surveys, or at least one cannot be certain 
of it before receiving the questionnaires. The ninth advantage, according to Bailey, is 
that the researcher can record the exact time and place of the interview. This is not the 
case with questionnaires. Importantly, the tenth advantage of the interview is its 
complexity. Bailey writes that "the interviewer has the chance to get more out of the 
interview as he can 'explain' the questions to the interviewee". (Bailey, 1987, pp. 174–
175)  
 
Miller and Salkind (2002, pp. 310–311) have produced a similar list of advantages of 
the interview method. Their list mostly conforms to Bailey's list. However, they also 
add a few important advantages of the interview method. They point out that in an 
interview, delicate situations, such as the interviewee getting irritated, can be handled. 
This is clearly not the case in questionnaires. Furthermore, Miller and Salkind raise an 
                                               
39
 This point proved to be valid. The spontaneous answers were often the most informative. 
40
 Many of the questions had to be repeated several times in alternative form before the interviewees 
provided a detailed enough answer. 
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important point concerning the flexibility of the interview method: they point out that 
the language used in the interview can be adapted to the educational level of the 
interviewee. Consequently, "therefore, it is comparatively easy to avoid 
misinterpretations or misleading questions." (Miller and Salkind, 2002, pp. 310–311) 
Indeed, some of the interview questions needed to be reworded despite the fact that all 
the interviewees were experts in their field. 
 
Altogether, the interview is a much more complete and thorough research method than a 
survey or a questionnaire. It is also much more flexible, as the interview situation can be 
amended to take into account the qualities of the respondent, such as whether he/she 
understands the questions correctly, or whether he/she feels comfortable in the situation.  
 
This thesis aims to map out how actors advocate policy changes into the nationally 
designed Partnership Contract, on basis of which the structural funds are distributed. 
The objective is to identify what kind of goals these actors have as regards the structural 
fund programmes' investment priorities and the Partnership Contract. Furthermore, one 
of the goals of this research is to find out what kind of strategies these actors employ in 
order to achieve these goals. In other words, the issues studied are relatively complex in 
nature. From this it follows that the methods used must be able to grasp the complexity 
of the phenomena studied.  
 
It could be argued that the qualitative interview is a suitable method for this kind of 
analysis. It is well suited to studies where one needs detailed, in-depth information, and 
where the interviewee's own interpretations are of high value. Further, the qualitative 
method is suitable when one needs to know the 'insider' perspective. This is arguably 
the case in matters pertaining to the complex and detailed structural fund policies and 
policy-making, of which an 'outsider' typically understands very little about. What's 
more, as one of the aims of this paper is to compare the different actors' objectives and 
strategies to each other and find out whether some of the actors could be considered to 
be acting together, as an 'advocacy coalition', to promote the same goals, one certainly 
needs to know the insider perspective to find this out. The WG‟s members‟ own 
interpretations of these matters are of vital importance in these questions.  
  
   59 
4.1.3.2. Disadvantages 
 
Bailey identifies eight disadvantages of the interview as a method: 
 
1. Cost 
2. Time 
3. Interview bias 
4. No opportunity to consult records 
5. Inconvenience 
6. Less anonymity 
7. Less standardized question wording 
8. Lack of accessibility to respondents 
(Bailey, 1987, pp. 175–176) 
 
Firstly, Bailey points out that interviewing may become a costly undertaking if one 
needs to travel a lot. Secondly, he discusses the time factor: interviews take a lot of 
time, require a lot of travelling and often take much longer than expected. All in all, 
Bailey writes, interviewing is time-consuming. The third point Bailey discusses is 
interview bias. He writes that the interviewer may make mistakes, misunderstand the 
answers of the interviewee, or fail to write down all the answers of the respondent. This 
will inevitably be a danger in a graduate thesis due to the inexperience of the researcher. 
Interestingly, Bailey also makes notice of the fact that the "respondent's answers can be 
affected by his or her reaction to the interviewer's sex, race, social class, age, dress, and 
physical appearance". In other words, there is a 'human element' in the interview that 
may affect the quality of the answers and also how they answers are interpreted. The 
realisation of these dangers is dependent on the personalities of the interviewer and the 
interviewed.  
 
The fourth point Bailey raises is related to the nature of the interview situation: due to 
the fact that the interviewee is normally expected to answer the questions right away, 
the possibility of the interviewee consulting the records for a more comprehensive 
answer is eliminated. Consequently there is a danger that some of the detail of the 
answers is lost. The fifth possible disadvantage is related to the timing of the interview. 
Sometimes the timing is simply bad: Bailey writes that sometimes the interviewer 
simply arrives at a bad time, and therefore gets unsatisfactory or otherwise poor 
answers, leading to a poor interview. The sixth disadvantage discussed by Bailey is the 
problem of anonymity. Sometimes the respondent refuses to answer questions fully if 
he/she feels that by answering he/she would be put in a bad situation, were the contents 
of the interview broadly published. For example, respondents might be unwilling to 
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discuss sensitive information that might put the respondent's company or organisation 
into a position of disadvantage in negotiations with their opponents. Or alternatively, 
the respondent might be unwilling to answer questions that might put them into an 
embarrassing position in front of their colleagues. For these reasons, the interviewees 
were promised that their names would not be published at any point in the research. 
This naturally limits the presentation of research findings somewhat, as I cannot 
disclose who has said what.
41
 On the other hand, confidentiality has arguably ensured 
that the respondents answer honestly, speak more directly, and hence provide more 
relevant and valid answers. In general the interviews turned out to be a rather successful 
endeavour. 
 
The seventh disadvantage discussed by Bailey is also one of the great advantages of the 
interview method: that of flexibility. Bailey points out that flexibility may be a problem 
if the interviewer is required to rephrase, reword, repeat or otherwise greatly modify the 
questions in order to get a satisfactory answer, as this may render the interviews 
difficult to compare. This may indeed pose a danger to this thesis. As the issues studied 
require the personal interpretations of the relevant actors in the field, it is highly likely 
that the questions will have to be modified to each interviewee. Furthermore, as the 
questions will probably have to be explained to some extent before the respondent can 
answer them, there is a danger that every respondent interprets those explanations 
differently. In sum, flexibility is a two-edged sword when it comes to the interview 
method: it is both a great advantage of the method but also one of the greatest pitfalls. 
Finally, the eighth possible disadvantage discussed by Bailey is that of accessibility. He 
writes that the travelling costs may simply prove too high. Indeed, this is a danger if it 
leads to a significant reduction in the number of good interviews carried out. (Bailey, 
1987, pp. 175–176) For this research, eleven interview requests were sent. As already 
mentioned, six respondents accepted to being interviewed, giving a response rate of 54 
%. One respondent declined as he thought that he did not know enough of the subject 
matter. Two respondents declined due to a busy schedule. Two respondents did not 
provide an explanation for their refusal. 
 
                                               
41
 There is one exception: The interviewee from the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
consented to his/her organisation‟s name to be published. 
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Naturally, Bailey's list of disadvantages is not exhaustive. However, these points are 
more or less confirmed by other authors on the topic (for example, see Miller and 
Salkind, 2002). Miller and Salkind also mention the 'human equation', as they call it. 
They discuss the possibility that some interviewers “may unconsciously ask questions 
so as to secure confirmation of their views”. (Miller and Salkind, 2002, pp. 312) It may 
become a problem if the interviewer does not ask questions which might be problematic 
for the researcher. For example, when trying to form a picture of the policy networks in 
Finland, one of the interviewees from organisation A might hold that organisation B has 
the same policy objectives and strategies with organisation A. Then, when interviewing 
a respondent from organisation B, I might be tempted not to ask whether the respondent 
feels that organisation A's policy objectives and strategies are similar to those of 
organisation B, as a negative answer would force me to start anew. Nonetheless, despite 
the inconvenience I am required to ask respondent B the same questions. As seen in the 
findings, this thesis could not provide a sufficiently accurate picture of some actors‟ 
policy stands, and hence these actors could not be grouped together with any other 
actor. This was due to the fact that some respondents provided conflicting information 
on other actors‟ policy positions. 
4.1.3.3. Structure of the Interview 
 
A qualitative interview consists of three key elements: main questions, follow-up 
questions, and probes. Main questions are meant for discussing the 'big picture', the 
more general issues. In this research, the main questions were the same for five of the 
interviewees.
42
 Rubin and Rubin write that the main questions "elicit the overall 
experiences and understandings of the conversational partner but might not provide the 
requisite depth to answer the research problem.” (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, pp. 164) The 
main questions can be found in the appendix. Follow-up questions, then, follow the 
main questions. Their purpose is to complement the information received from answers 
to the main questions. They are based on what has been said by the interviewee as a 
response to the main questions. Rubin and Rubin write that the follow-up questions 
"build on what the interviewee has said to get a better and deeper understanding of the 
                                               
42
 One of the interviewees was an employee from the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, who 
was fairly well acquainted with the work of the 2014+ Working Group. The questions for this interviewee 
were somewhat different, and more focused to the work of the 2014 + Working Group. 
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interviewee's answers.” (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, pp. 164). In the interviews, the follow-
up questions often led to the most fruitful answers. 
 
Finally, the third key element in a qualitative interview are probes. Probes are often 
signs of body language, such as nodding to encourage the respondent to continue or to 
stop, or other elements that guide the direction of the conversation. For example, the 
interviewer can repeat what the respondent has just said to encourage the respondent to 
elaborate further on the topic.
43
 Or alternatively, the interviewer can ask the interviewee 
to clarify what she has just said. Probes are not high on content, as main questions or 
even follow-up questions would be. Rather, probes are tools to help ease the flow of 
conversation, guide it to the right issue areas, or to redirect the conversation. Probes, 
Rubin and Rubin write, “help you manage the conversation by regulating the length of 
answers and degree of detail, clarifying unclear sentences of phrases, filling in missing 
steps, and keeping the conversation on topic”. (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, pp. 164) 
 
Miller and Salkind (2002, pp. 309–310) write that there are different types of 
interviews. They range from a highly flexible, informal, unstructured discussion to a 
rigidly planned and structured discussion involving a list of questions that form the 
body of the interview. The type of interview is chosen according to the needs of 
research. The researcher must take into account the level of detail required from the 
discussion, but also ensure that the discourse stays on topic. Miller and Salkind warn: 
The degrees of freedom pose both opportunity and danger: opportunity to explore many 
subjects with intensity, but with the danger that the interview may not yield the appropriate 
data. (Miller and Salkind, 2002, pp. 309–310) 
4.1.4. Elite Interview 
 
This thesis employs the elite interview method. „Elite‟ in this thesis is defined using C. 
Wright Mills‟ notion of power elite. Mills defines the elite as the people who are in 
leading positions in central organisations. They also possess knowledge that others do 
not have. (Mykkänen, 2001, pp. 109) The elite interview is a semi-structured interview 
that is suitable to studies where one needs in-depth, context-dependent expert 
information (Berry, 2002, pp. 682). It is also called the focused interview. When 
comparing an elite interview into a structured survey, there are two reasons why one 
might choose the interview over a survey. Firstly, sometimes the researcher lacks a 
                                               
43
 This was often done in the interviews, and often also led to fruitful answers. 
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sufficient understanding of events, which makes it impossible to write a structured 
survey that would put forward questions that were precise enough to produce a 
meaningful answer from the respondent. Secondly, in an elite interview the researcher 
often wants to know the respondent's own interpretation of the situation. A poorly 
constructed structured survey would risk excluding important questions and therefore 
omitting valuable information possessed by the respondent. (Johnson, Reynolds and 
Joslyn, 2011, pp. 272) 
 
Johnson, Reynolds, and Joslyn (2001, pp. 275) argue that the elite interview is 
especially fitting when one interviews people who are actively involved in the political 
issue area studied. They write that elite interviewing "often provides a more 
comprehensive and complicated understanding of political phenomena than other forms 
of data collection, and it provides researchers with a rich variety of perspectives" 
(Johnson, Reynolds, and Joslyn, 2001, pp. 275). The people who work in the area the 
researcher is studying naturally know quite a lot about it given that it is a part of their 
work. If one wants to know why something happened in a parliament, one should 
interview a parliamentarian. Or alternatively, if one wants to understand the complex 
field of European Union regional policy and more specifically, the Finnish context of 
cohesion politics, an elite interview would arguably be the method required, as it would 
provide an insight into the fairly complex topic. 
 
The key rule for conducting an elite interview is that one is well prepared for it. Berry 
writes that when one knows the topic fairly well, one gets much more out of the 
interview as one is able to avoid the pitfalls and focus on the important questions. 
(Berry, 2002, pp. 681) Otherwise time is spent on discussing irrelevant points that are of 
no value to the research. Johnson, Reynolds, and Joslyn point out that one must ask 'the 
right questions'. Experts hate to waste their time talking about issues that could have 
been read from the newspaper, books, or elsewhere. Instead, "if, on the other hand, the 
subject believes that only she or he can help you, then you are more likely to gain her or 
his cooperation.” By being well prepared the researcher ensures that the interviewee 
treats him/her favourably and respectfully. This is particularly important when the 
researcher is a novice with little experience in carrying out interviews. One must, 
therefore, do one's homework well. In practise this means that one studies the relevant 
literature, is well acquainted with the latest policy decisions in the field, has read the 
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material available from the organisation that the interviewee represents, and preferably 
knows something about the background of the person interviewed. (Johnson, Reynolds, 
and Joslyn, 2001, pp. 273) 
 
One of the possible problems with elite interviews is that access to the elites may 
sometimes turn out to be challenging. The target interviewees may turn out to be too 
busy, uninterested, or for other reasons difficult to access. Furthermore, sometimes the 
interviewees may be rather sceptical of the researcher's motives, and may question the 
professionalism of the interviewer (Johnson, Reynolds and Joslyn, 2001, pp. 273). 
Indeed, the researcher may need to convince the elite respondents of the sincerity of 
his/her motives. 
 
In elite interviews, questions of confidentiality may arise if the topics covered in the 
interviews relate to sensitive issues. Mykkänen writes that the researcher should deal 
with confidentiality issues before one starts to contact the interviewees for possible 
interviews. This, Mykkänen argues, increases the likelihood of getting relevant 
interview material. Questions of anonymity are likely to arise in situations where the 
elites are interviewed for their own interpretation of a delicate political issue, or when 
the elite interviewees are asked to tell their own opinions of other elite members. Thus, 
it is crucial that one decides early on what is to be revealed of the respondents in the 
research, and what not. In some surveys it is important to protect the identity of the 
respondents. When one interviews individuals people from a selected group of people, 
situations may arise where the respondents would like to know who are the other people 
interviewed. Mykkänen writes that it depends on the researcher to make the choice of 
whether one reveals to identity of other respondents, or not. The benefit of this may be 
that the interviewees are more likely to give an interview when they know who are the 
others interviewed. However, this naturally reveals the identity of the interviewees to 
others. (Mykkänen, 2001, pp. 114–121). I decided not to reveal the identity of the 
interviewees to each other. This consequently means that I cannot disclose the identity 
of the interviewees in this thesis. Therefore I talk about the interviewees on a more 
general level, only identifying what type of organization they represent. Further, given 
that this thesis was able to classify the different policy actors into two coalitions, the 
actors are referred to as members of a particular coalition in the findings section. Given 
that the membership of the identified coalitions was broad enough not to endanger the 
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disclosure of the policy actors‟ identities, this approach seems to be a useful way to 
discuss the findings. This naturally leads to some limitations when it comes to the 
presentation of the results, as I cannot fully enclose whose comments I am citing. 
However, it could be argued that the provision of confidentiality is justified on the basis 
that the respondents were likely to provide more accurate and detailed information 
when they knew that their identity will not be revealed.  
 
The researcher should keep in mind that the respondent is not obliged to be impartial 
and objective when being interviewed.  Berry points out that the elite often have 
something they want to say: “They're talking about their work and, as such, justifying 
what they do. That's no small matter.” (Berry, 2002, pp. 680) Therefore one should not 
assume that even though the elite respondents often understand that the researcher is 
trying to be objective and carry out professional research, the respondents would be 
objective too. It is likely that the interviewees will provide with one way to interpret the 
events, and this is not the only interpretation. Consequently, a good way to examine the 
plausibility of the interviewee‟s statements is to compare them with those of another 
interviewee (Johnson, Reynolds and Joslyn, 2001, pp. 275). Interestingly, many of the 
interviewees even conflicted their own statements during the course of the interviews. 
For example, when asked about the administrative infrastructure of the structural funds, 
two of interviewees at first said that they have no policy stand on the issue. However, in 
the end of the interview, when asked again about the same topic, they clearly stated 
their stand on the issue. 
 
Qualitative interviews are conversations. In many ways the same rules apply to them 
that would apply to a normal conversation. According to Berry, 
the best interviewer is not one who writes the best questions. Rather, excellent interviewers 
are excellent conversationalists. They make interviews seem like a good talk among old 
friends. (Berry, 2002, pp. 679) 
 
One should therefore avoid the interviewing becoming dominated by the interviewer. 
The interviewer should give enough time and space for the respondent to elaborate on 
his/her answers. All in all, the interviewer, who is not an expert, should be in a side role 
in the interview, and should let the respondent dominate the conversation as long as the 
topics discussed are based on the questions. As the respondents are experts, they should 
be interviewed as such. 
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There are differing opinions on the appropriate length of an interview. Miller and 
Salkind (2002, pp. 310) hold that 45 minutes is a convenient duration. I carried out 
interviews of this length. However, I allowed for flexibility if the interview took longer 
than 45 minutes. The questionnaire included the introductory part of the interview, 
through which the respondent was introduced to the topic, and some important 
background information, such as information on issues of confidentiality, a summary of 
the research conducted, and advice for the interviewee. The interviews, which were 
carried out in February 2012, started with general questions on the respondents‟ role in 
their organisation. However, the third question was already fairly detailed, and it 
introduced the respondent to the topic of the interview. The questions were fairly 
detailed to avoid the discussion from getting sidetracked and going „off-topic‟. The 
same questions were repeated in slightly different form to maintain the focus on the 
relevant issues and also to enable the respondent to elaborate further on the topics. In 
sum, the interviews‟ goal was to identify the respondent's organisation's position on the 
Partnership Contract‟s content, and to identify possible „allies‟ in the field who advocate 
for similar policy solutions. The interview was also meant to shed light on possible 
"adversaries" of the respondent's organisation. These organisations would advocate for a 
different policy line as regards the Partnership Contract policy priorities. 
 
In the next section I provide an account of the findings of the interviews. 
4.2. Key findings 
 
The first section provides an account of the identified advocacy coalitions. 
Subsequently I discuss the other key findings of the interviews, which were: the 
generally acknowledged need to reduce structural fund bureaucracy, the debate over the 
administrative model, the level of coordination between the advocacy coalitions‟ 
members, the Finnish tradition of revamping the administrative structure of the 
structural fund administration at the start of every new programme period, the division 
within the Ministry of Employment and the Economy over the administrative model, 
the partiality of the Working Group‟s secretariat and chairpersons, the fight over 
structural fund resources, and the perceived fear of the structural funds being used to 
compensate for cuts in other policy sectors, and the role of the Finnish government as 
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the „final gatekeeper‟ in EU regional policy. Lastly the findings are assessed in the light 
of the advocacy coalition frameworks model. 
 
It should at first be mentioned that the respondents had been involved in EU structural 
funds politics for relatively long. The average number of years that they had worked in 
matters related to EU structural policy was 11.8 years.
44
 They had not been in the same 
position, and in the same organisation for the whole time. However, as they had been 
involved in the policy field, it is likely that they are fairly well 'networked' in the 
Finnish context. According to the ACF, "understanding the process of policy change --- 
requires a time perspective of a decade or more" (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 99). Given the 
average of years that the interviewees have been involved in structural policy matters, it 
can be argued that the respondents possessed valid enough knowledge of how structural 
policy works in Finland. All in all, the interviews provided rich material on the making 
of EU regional policy in Finland. 
4.2.1. Identified advocacy coalitions 
 
One of the main findings was that the Working Group had not yet discussed the content 
of the Partnership Contract extensively. The Partnership Contract had not "inflamed any 
passions yet", as one of the interviewees put it. (Interview A, 2012) One reason for this 
was that the group was divided over the question of how to organise the national EU 
regional policy administrative structures.
45
 The Working Group had not been able to 
agree on the administrative structure for the structural fund programmes for the next 
programme period, and was waiting for a political decision from a higher ministerial 
working group. The administrative model was a watershed dividing the Working 
Group's members into two coalitions. In the interviews it turned out that no great divide 
exists over the investment priorities for the next programme period. It seemed that all 
members agreed that the investments should be focused on fewer priorities due to the 
worsening of the economic conditions. However, the WG had not discussed the 
                                               
44
 I will not discuss this in greater detail in order not to reveal the respondents' identity. 
45
 The member state is to declare the way the national structural funds infrastructure is organised in the 
Partnership Contract. In the Decision Establishing the Working Group, it is briefly stated in task three 
that the Working Group is "to issue a proposal on --- the model of governance for the programmes". As 
mentioned, the Working Group had not been able to agree on the model. The administrative architecture 
determines who controls the funds, makes the financing decisions etc. As the Working Group had not 
been able to agree on the architecture, the decision was transferred to a higher political level.  
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priorities extensively, and it was thus too early to say anything final on this yet.
46
 For 
this reason, the research focus had to be narrowed down to the administrative model. 
 
In the course of the interviews, two advocacy  coalitions were identified, which had 
clearly contrasting views over the question of the institutional architecture. Members of 
the first coalition lobbied for an administrative structure that is above all regional. The 
second coalition supported the centralisation of the administration of the structural fund 
programmes to the ministries‟ control, and the reduction of the powers of the regional 
level (the Regional Councils in particular).
47
 These two coalitions that were identified 
were named as a) Regionalists and b) Centralists. As said, the main issue dividing the 
members of the Working Group into these coalitions was the administrative model. One 
interviewee, discussing the divide of the WG into two camps and the WG's inability to 
reach a compromise on the model, said that: 
If the other [party] starts from above, and the other from below, it is slightly challenging [to 
reach a compromise]. (Interview A, 2012) 
 
Broadly speaking, the two coalitions‟ membership was classified as follows: 
Coalition A / Regionalists: 
 
 The Association of Finnish Local and 
Regional Authorities 
 All the regional councils 
 Centres for Economic Development, 
Transport and the Environment  
 The Central Union of Agricultural 
Producers and Forest Owners (MTK) 
 Regional Development branch of the 
Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (of the former Ministry of the 
Interior) 
 Regional Development Companies 
(SEKES ry) 
Coalition B / Centralists: 
 
 Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy 
 the Confederation of Finnish Industries 
(EK) 
 Central Organisation of Finnish Trade 
Unions (SAK) 
 The Finnish Confederation of Salaried 
Employees (STTK) 
 The former Ministry of Employment 
staff in the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy, esp. people who have 
worked with the ESF 
 Ministry of Education and Culture 
 Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
 
Some members of the working group and their organisations could not be classified into 
any of the coalitions. Either there was not sufficient information on the actors‟ policy 
strategies, or the actors did not have a clear stand on the issue. I have marked the 
organisations whose stand could not be verified („Unclear‟) and the organisations whose 
                                               
46
 The WG's members had issued written statements on the investment priorities for the WG's secretariat. 
However, at this stage the ruling out of proposals for the investment priorities had not begun yet, and thus 
no ideas or proposals had been rejected yet. It is possible that the members of the WG were therefore 
under the (false?) impression that no great disagreements exist over the investment priorities. 
47
 However, some members of the Working Group did not clearly belong to one of these two coalitions. 
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stand was unknown („Not classified‟). The former group‟s members‟ policy strategy 
regarding the administrative model could not be sufficiently well clarified due to 
conflicting information from the interviewees. It seemed that the Working Group‟s 
members did not know every other members‟ policy stand well enough. 
Unclear: 
 The Central Chamber of Commerce 
 The Ministry of Finance 
 Ministry of the Environment 
 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
 
Not classified: 
 The Coalition of Finnish Women´s 
Associations (NYTKIS) 
4.2.2. Reducing the complex bureaucracy 
 
Interestingly, most of the interviewees from both coalitions acknowledged the need to 
reduce the bureaucracy involved with the administration of the structural funds. 
Furthermore, the respondents also accepted that the ESF and the ERDF be joined 
together under a single administration. An interviewee from Coalition B: 
Interviewer: What do you mean by lightening the administration? 
 
Respondent D: Well, it is linked to what we already discussed, that the structural funds are 
possibly joined together, focused thematically, and united under one common strategy, then 
we believe it should follow that there are less administrative civil servants and more 
emphasis can be put into the actual work. (Interview D, 2012) 
 
The interviewees from both coalitions accepted the Commission's goals (of slimming 
down the bureaucracy) in this area.  An interviewee from Coalition A: 
We have to simplify the administrative structures at a time when the economy is 
performing poorly.  
--- 
It is the question over the administration that divides [the Working Group] the most. I do 
not believe that we will have major problems with the content of the programmes and other 
things. Given that the proposals for the decisions already exist [reference to the 
Commission‟s proposals], and a majority [of the Working Group‟s members] have already 
confirmed them, that there is nothing there. But in Finland we discuss the administration 
first. (Interview F, 2012) 
 
Furthermore, respondents from both coalitions generally seemed to accept the need to 
focus on a fewer investment priorities. Respondent F mentioned the (poor) state of the 
economy and the fact that the amount of funding Finland will receive is likely to 
decrease as the main reasons for this. On a theoretical level, all the interviewees 
supported the goal of reducing the complex bureaucracy and agreed that the structural 
fund administration should be simplified. However, they had differing opinions on how 
to do it. 
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4.2.3. Debate over the administrative model 
 
It is good to mention that the discussion over the investment priorities, in the sense that 
which issues we emphasise, that it has not even been opened up yet. Now we are discussing 
this...the institutional architecture, meaning what kind of governance we carry out the next 
programme period with. --- It would have been nicer to talk about what kind of issues we 
try to achieve, for example through the Social Fund [ESF]. (Interview C, 2012) 
 
When the interviews were being carried out, the Working Group had recently discussed 
a proposal, which, if implemented, would dramatically reduce the responsibilities of the 
regional authorities in the administration of the structural fund programmes.
48
 The 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy had issued a proposal where the 
administrative responsibilities of the regional councils in the management of the 
structural funds would have been greatly reduced. The idea behind this proposal was 
that this way the number of administrative personnel involved in structural policy could 
be reduced, and the bureaucracy thus reduced. The minister Jyri Häkämies, who is 
responsible for EU regional policy in Finland, has announced that it is his aim to reduce 
the structural fund bureaucracy and to lighten the structural fund administration. 
(Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 2011f) The regional councils have been the 
regional managing authorities in the structural policy. The proposal would have 
therefore stripped them of one of their important tasks, the managing of the regional 
policy funds. 
 
This was an interesting finding. One would assume that the discussion would have been 
about where to invest the structural funds. Quite the contrary, this topic had not been 
extensively discussed. One WG‟s member from Coalition B, whose organisation is a 
social partner, said that the administrative architecture has been a source of 
disagreement since the group‟s first meeting, 
what has been somewhat funny, that we have proceeded with the administrative model, 
before we have for example thought what the Finnish priority could be for the programme. 
Normally it should be defined the other way round, that first come the priorities, and then, 
after that, you consider the administration [of the programmes]. 
 
On the basis of the interviews it was concluded that most ministries seemed to support 
the centralisation of the structural fund programme administration, whereas the regional 
                                               
48
 The question over the model of governance for the structural fund programmes is not in a dominant 
position in the Decision Establishing the Working Group. See chapter on EU regional policy. Indeed, 
from the Decision, one is likely to infer that the question over institutional architecture would not be in 
such a central role, as it is named only at the end of the third task of the group, after the questions over the 
investment priorities, the structures of the programmes and the programme areas. However, it has clearly 
become the major source of disagreement. 
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level actors, such as the ELY-centres and the regional councils, opposed the 
centralisation of the programmes‟ administration. This seems natural, given that the 
ministries‟ control over the administration of the structural fund programmes would 
increase were the proposal implemented, and the role of the Regional Councils would 
be dramatically reduced. There were differing views among the Working Group‟s 
members about the right solution. One of the interviewees implied that the stronger the 
regional presence of the organisation, the likelier they are to oppose the centralisation of 
the structural fund programmes‟ administration. Indeed, most of the interviewees 
clearly indicated that the ministries, which do not have a regional presence, clearly 
support and lobby for the centralisation of the programme architecture.  
 
The European Commission‟s proposal and the Finnish government‟s policy line were 
generally accepted by the members of the Working Group. Most of the members seem 
to agree that the investments should be focused more, and that they should be in line 
with the Europe 2020 Strategy. However, the investment priorities have not been 
discussed extensively yet, which is why it is difficult to identify any great differences of 
opinion between the Working Group‟s members regarding the investment priorities.  
4.2.4. Policy coordination between the coalition members 
 
One of the findings was that the regional councils had coordinated their work fairly 
extensively. For example, they had issued policy opinions together to the group‟s 
secretariat. The interviewees generally acknowledged that the regional councils were 
speaking with „one voice‟. However, apart from this clear sign of policy coordination, 
most of the interaction between the coalition members had taken place in the WG‟s 
meetings.
49
 Some individual actors had coordinated their policy stands, and even met 
outside the meetings to discuss the WG‟s work, but generally the findings suggest that it 
cannot be argued that the two coalitions would have systematically worked to ensure 
that their policy strategies are in internally consistent. This may also be due to the fact 
that no coordination was needed in the matter, as the learning took place in the 
meetings. As the ACF theory holds, actors are likely to learn from one another in policy 
forums, such as the 2014+ Working Group. Nevertheless, if one strictly applies the ACF 
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 One of the interviewees implied that 90 % of the lobbying takes place outside the group‟s meetings. 
However, as the sample of this paper consists of the 2014 WG‟s members, it cannot be assessed whether 
there are other coalitions (or actors that would belong to the two identified coalitions) outside the WG.  
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model, the actors should have known each other for at least ten years, and should 
actively engage in coordinating their action. Only the former of these premises was 
realised. In this sense the level of coordinated action between the two coalitions‟ 
members was, with the exception of the regional councils, modest. 
4.2.5. Finnish tradition of revamping the structural fund administration 
 
Some of the interviewees from Coalition A implied that the administrative structure of 
the structural funds is modified in Finland at the start of every new programme period. 
An interviewee had taken part in the drawing up of the previous programme periods, 
and implied that it is typical in Finland to modify the administrative model of the 
structural funds at the start of every new programme period: 
Respondent F: Drawing up the programmes is not an issue – the most difficult part is to 
organise the administrative structure.  
---  
Interviewer: Ok, so has this [debate] taken place before too? 
 
Respondent F: We have the same dispute every programme period, how to get this done, 
what the meaning of the regions is, or whether they have any meaning at all. 
 
Interviewer: Why do you think that the same dispute takes place every programme period? 
 
Respondent F: Well, that is a good question, considering that the EU promotes a Europe of 
regions, that the regions decide. The state administration is very powerful in Finland. And 
then they notice that you get money out of this [structural funds] – albeit that first the 
money is paid there and then you get it back after great trouble – and they want to have 
their share of the pie. It is very simple. (Interview F, 2012) 
 
This says something of the Finnish political system as regards EU cohesion policy-
making. Many of the actors involved, especially the central administration and the 
ministries with no regional presence, seem to see the structural funds as a way to access 
EU funding for their own purposes, whatever they may be. The interviewees from the 
Regionalists‟ coalition implied that the thinking for some actors seems to be that the EU 
money is „there for the taking‟, and one must only come up with a way to access it. 
Indeed, the fact that some of the interviewees expressed concern that the EU funds are 
not used to promote the goals of cohesion policy, but other goals, be it national, 
ministerial, or other, seems to indicate this. It was suggested that the thinking that „this 
is our money and we are entitled to it‟ seems to prevail in some circles despite the 
clearly stated goal that the cohesion funds are meant for the regions.  
 
One could ask whether the WG has proceeded in the right order of things. Indeed, it 
would seem logical that the institutional architecture can be properly discussed only 
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once the investment priorities are known. The institutional architecture, to an outsider, 
seems to be the tool which is used to distribute the funds effectively. How can it be 
designed before the actual investment priorities are known? A lot would depend on the 
investment priorities that are chosen. If one is to prevent the exclusion of young people 
through the ESF, then a more centralised institutional structure would seem justified, as 
the problems are likely to be similar all over the country. On the other hand, if the goal 
is to make the most of the local potential in facilitating the growth of green-tech through 
the ERDF, for example, then it would seem that a more local administrative 
infrastructure would better support this goal. Hence one could ask whether the WG has 
proceeded in the right order of things. Given the criticism of the respondents, it would 
seem that the administrative architecture quarrel has at least been disproportionately 
emphasised in the WG‟s work. The discussion over the investment priorities is also an 
important discussion, and it had apparently not even been properly begun. 
4.2.6. Internal division in the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
 
Another important finding was that that the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
was divided into several camps. Division existed within the ministry regarding the 
administrative architecture of the structural fund programmes. One of the interviewees 
implied that the people from the former regional department of the Ministry of the 
Interior and the people from the former Ministry of Employment would have differing 
policy stands regarding the architecture, with the former belonging to Coalition A and 
latter to Coalition B.
50
 More specifically, the staff from the former Ministry of 
Employment, who had worked with ESF issues, supported the Centralists‟ claim. 
Several interviewees from both coalitions implied that the internal division within the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy had complicated the WG‟s work.  
 
The interviewees implied that the structures of the old ministries still divided the new 
ministry. Representatives from the same ministry had differing opinions regarding the 
administrative model. 
Respondent F: Then there are differing views within the ministry [of Employment and the 
Economy], what I wonder a bit, when different departments of the same ministry speak 
differently, that one would think, given that the chairman [of the Working Group] is from 
the ministry, that they would sort things out by themselves before they come to the meeting 
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 These two ministries were joined together, and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy was 
formed in 2008. 
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to quarrel, but.. It is interesting – well they do not really quarrel – but there are differing 
viewpoints. 
 
In other words, people from the same ministry belonged to different advocacy 
coalitions. This is an important finding. With the help of the ACF it became clear that 
the ministries are not unitary actors, but there are differences of opinion within them. 
These internal power struggles had affected the work of the working group, and the 
interviewees also indicated that the secretariat and the chairpersons were also somewhat 
divided over the administrative model. Some interviewees found this confusing. In sum, 
it cannot be argued that the ministries would simply implement the government‟s will. 
The ACF exposed the division within the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. 
4.2.7. The partiality of the policy broker 
 
One of the findings was that the policy brokers, the secretariat and the chairpersons of 
the Working Group, were advancing their own ministry‟s goals in the WG. It was thus 
established that the secretariat of the Working group is not an entirely impartial policy 
broker, but has a political role. An interviewee from the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy clearly acknowledged that the secretariat‟s role is political: 
Respondent E: Well, it is political [the secretariat‟s role]. Yes, it is pretty political a role, 
that people promote certain things there. People promote their own ministry‟s goals there. 
 
The respondent put it interestingly: that the secretariat tries to be “as objective as 
possible”, but still wants something from the process. (Interview E, 2012) This finding 
confirms Ingold and Varone‟s (2012) criticism of the ACF. They criticised the ACF for 
failing to account for situations where “interest-based behavior best characterized the 
policy brokers”. It would therefore seem that the policy brokers also have their own 
material interests in mind. They seek to balance the different advocacy coalitions‟ 
interests and mediate conflict, but they are not entirely neutral, and they also advance 
their own organisation‟s goals. 
4.2.8. Accounting for organisational and individual interest maximisation 
 
Many of the interviewees implied that the debate over the institutional architecture is a 
part of a „political game‟, where the different institutions fight for their own power and 
resources. This is an interesting finding, as it is in no way evident in the Decision 
Establishing the Working Group that the Working Group is likely to be an arena of a 
political turf war between these actors. Below is a short extract from a discussion on the 
debate over the administrative architecture. 
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Interviewer: Why has the group not found a consensus on it [the institutional architecture]? 
 
Respondent E: Well, because people, well not people, but administrations, there are these 
power aspirations of course, that the administration want to keep its own monies, its own 
power, it is quite simple. 
--- 
Respondent E: That if you have thought that we think [a reference to the common 
good/objective thinking]..That there people in here, that it's only in political speeches.. One 
defends one's own sector. And that also goes for the Regional Councils, the ELY centres, 
the ministries, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, and all these 
partners, that they all view things from their own standpoint. 
--- 
Respondent E: Well I do not want to bother you with these internal struggles of ours here, 
but yes; it is pretty intense power struggle, this whole process. (Interview E, 2012) 
 
However, a few of the respondents from the social partners implied that they have no 
crucial interest in this fight. Nevertheless, the social partners too have taken sides in the 
debate, signalling that the matter is of some relevance to them. Consequently, one 
finding was that there were those actors who consider the question over the institutional 
architecture an existential question, and those who have an opinion on the debate, but 
do not treat the issue as something that would be of vital interest for their organisation. 
 
It has also been interesting to note that the ELY-centres, which are the government‟s 
arm in the regions, seem to support the Regionalists‟ claim, despite the fact that the 
ELY centres are supposed to represent the government in the region. Furthermore, it is 
also interesting that the employee and employer organisations (EK, SAK, STTK) seem 
support the centralised administrative structural fund programme structure. One way to 
look at the reasons for the Working Group‟s members‟ policy preferences would be to 
look at the institutional architecture of these organisations themselves. Many of the 
interviewees have considered it to be “natural” and “understandable” that the 
organisations that have a strong regional presence also belong to those organisations 
who defend the administrative powers of the regional level, and that those 
organisations, which have a more centralised administrative structure
51
 consequently 
support the increased centralisation of the structural fund programmes‟ administration.  
 
This finding resonates with Schlager and Blomqvist‟s criticism of the ACF‟s failure to 
account for the policy actors advocating a policy solution that would best promote their 
own organisational and individual self-interest. They believe that instead of trying to 
derive complex accounts of different actors‟ the policy core through an analysis of the 
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 This means that they are less represented in the regions, and more represented in the capital. 
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actors „belief system‟, we should simply try to identify which policy solution would 
benefit the actors in question the most: this is the policy solution that the actors are 
likely to advocate, Schlager and Blomqvist imply. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
finding that regional actors lobby for the increase/maintenance at the same level of their 
powers and the more Helsinki-centred actors lobby for the centralisation of powers to 
Helsinki is not a finding at all, but self-evident. These actors simply lobby for a policy 
that is the most beneficial for them. It thus seems that the findings in this study confirm 
Schlager and Blomqvist‟s criticism of the ACF.  
4.2.9. Fear of the structural funds being used to compensate for governmental 
budget cuts 
 
Some of the interviewees, mostly belonging to coalition A, expressed their concern over 
the structural funds being used in areas that have experienced/are about to experience 
governmental budget cuts. Several interviewees, once again mostly from Coalition A, 
suggested that the ministries in particular are looking for new ways to receive funding, 
and hence have expressed interest in the structural fund's architecture's centralisation. 
All of the interviewees acknowledged that budget cuts both at the national level, and 
also in the funding that Finland receives from the EU through the structural funds, have 
altered the conditions. One interviewee from Coalition A argued that the ministries, 
especially the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health, advocate for the centralisation of the structural funds' administration in the hope 
of having more say in the allocation of the funds. 
Taking into account that when the funds are cut, both in national and EU politics, and 
especially on the national side, then everyone wants to be more involved in the structural 
funds work, to share the same cup, in the hope of getting more funds from there. (Interview 
F, 2012) 
4.2.10. Finnish government as the final gatekeeper 
 
Another important finding regarding the work of the 2014+ Working Group has been 
that all the actors generally acknowledge that the government ultimately has the final 
word on the content of the Partnership Contract. One respondent, being asked whether 
the Partnership principle is realised in practise, said: 
Respondent C: Well no, it is not realised in the end --- because.. the council of state 
underwrites this Partnership Contract for Finland. And even though this preparatory work, 
having taken part in it a few times, is based on partnership, the council of state can 
nevertheless, as it were, "state", that "this is Finland's official paper". 
--- 
Respondent C: And at some point the document gets re-modified. And that's where it 
[partnership] fails. (Interview C, 2012) 
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This confirms the statement in the chapter discussing the Finnish system of governance 
that the government is the „final gate-keeper‟ in Finnish EU regional policy. When 
discussing whether the Partnership principle is realised in practise, the respondents 
maintained that despite the fact that they are allowed to take part in the discussion of the 
Working Group, issue their own opinions in writing to the secretariat of the group, and 
to address their disagreement/agreement with the Chair‟s proposals, the Finnish 
government ultimately decides what the Partnership Contract will contain in the next 
structural fund programme period. Despite the fact that it is clearly stated in the 
Decision Establishing the Working Group that the group shall make the proposals for 
the content of the Partnership Contract, the group is in fact in no position to disagree 
with the government on the core aspects of the Partnership Contract.  
 
One could therefore argue that the Working Group is a talking shop, as no decisions or 
actions necessarily arise from the discussion. The function of the Working Group seems 
to be to keep the government informed of the opinion of the partners, not to actually 
necessarily incorporate them into the final decision establishing the Finnish proposal for 
the content of the Partnership Contract. Another function of the Working Group seems 
to be to legitimate the regional policy decision-making process. The partners are 
listened to, but not necessarily heard, especially if they disagree with the government‟s 
view. Albeit that the realisation of the partnership principle is not in a central posit ion in 
this thesis, this finding is nevertheless worth noting. 
4.3. Explaining the findings through the ACF model 
 
In this section I examine the findings in the light of the ACF model. The section starts 
with the identified systemic changes. Then the policy learning and feedback of the 
actors is assessed. After that, I discuss how one should account for policy actors 
maximising their organisation‟s welfare. Lastly I briefly assess the validity of the 
ACF‟s hypotheses regarding policy change, policy learning and advocacy coalitions. 
4.3.1. External system events and relatively stable parameters 
 
According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, the external system events and relatively 
stable parameters are factors that constrain or provide resources for the actors in 
advocating for their policy solution, depending on what kind of policy preferences the 
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actors have. The external system events or changes in the stable system parameters that 
have been identified in the interviews are: 
External system events 
 – The economic crisis 
 – Globalisation 
 – Ageing of the population 
 – Europe 2020 Strategy 
 – Reform of the municipal system 
 – The governmental programme 
 – Absence of the Centre party from 
government52 
 – Increased exclusion of certain parts of 
the population 
 – Increased youth unemployment 
 – The structural change in the economy, 
the closures of major factories and their 
relocation into countries of cheaper 
labour 
 – The minister Jyri Häkämies‟ 
determination to reduce the structural 
fund bureaucracy and to lighten the 
administration 
Relatively stable parameters 
 
 – The decrease in the amount of 
funding that Finland will receive from 
the EU 
 – Governmental spending cuts, and 
savings programme53 
 – The cut in the funds that Finland 
receives from the EU through the 
structural funds 
 
4.3.1.1. External system events 
 
All the interviewees identified the current on-going economic crisis as a major change 
in the external environment.
54
 It could be argued that the economic crisis is the most 
dramatic factor, as it has arguably led to many of the other identified external system 
events and changes in the relatively stable parameters.
55
 One could thus say that the 
economic crisis represents a super-systemic change at the EU level and the national 
level, which has profoundly shaped the playing field in EU regional policy. The Europe 
2020 Strategy consequently embodies many of the desired policy changes that are 
considered crucial due to the economic crisis.
56
 
 
                                               
52
 Some of the interviewees have implied that the centralisation of the structural funds would not have 
been possible under a government, where the Centre Party would have been a member. Indeed, one 
interviewee suggested that the reform is about taking down the administrative architecture that was 
created during the Centre Party‟s governmental period. The absence of the Center Party from government 
is therefore classified in the category “3. Changes in the systemic governing coalition”. 
53
 „Valtion tuottavuusohjelma‟ in Finnish. 
54
 The economic crisis is classified as “1. Change in socio-economic conditions”. 
55
 It could be argued that the Europe 2020 Strategy, the reform of the Finnish municipal system, the 
themes in the governmental program, the increased exclusion of people, the increased youth 
unemployment, and the structural change in the economy with the closures of factories, as well as the EU 
and Finnish budget cuts, are all partly a consequence of the economic crisis.  
56
 The EU 2020 Strategy is classified in the category “4. Policy decisions and impacts from other 
subsystems”. Although it is not in a strict sense a policy decision, it is a policy guideline that greatly 
guides the national policymaking in the EU member states. 
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Another important external system event is the absence of the Center Party from 
government.
57
 One of the interviewee, from Coalition B discussing why the 
administrative architecture question had assumed such as dominant position in the 
WG‟s discussions, implied that the Centralists try to make the use of this change in the 
government: 
respondent B: [The administrative model] has been the focus, but you have had a lot of, it is 
very clear, you have Ministry of Employment and the Economy‟s willingness to alter this 
regional policy and its actors, and the reform of the municipal system, and a lot of political 
play/game, and the Center Party is not in government anymore, and all these factors have 
affected it, that we have probably started with the administrative model. 
 
Here one can certainly identify three important factors. Firstly, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy has attempted to reshape the Finnish EU regional policy 
administration. As already discussed in relation to the policy broker concept, the 
ministry clearly advances its own goals in the Working Group. Secondly, the reform of 
the municipal system by the same government is also characterised by a goal of cutting 
costs by slimming down the administrative structures, and joining together of 
municipalities, and hence has of a lot of similarities with the Centralists‟ policy goals. 
The governmental programme, which was also mentioned by many of the respondents 
as a change in the working environment, clearly guides Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy‟s work in cohesion policy. The Ministry is headed by a minister from the 
National Coalition Party, Jyri Häkämies, who is from the same party as the Minister of 
Public Administration and Local Government Henna Virkkunen. It seems that the 
absence of the Center Party from government has created conditions which have 
encouraged the Centralists to advance their policy goals. The absence of the Center 
Party from government makes it easier for the Centralists to advocate for their policy 
line (resource), and more difficult for the Regionalists to oppose the centralisation of the 
administrative structure of the structural funds (constraint). Furthermore, the economic 
crisis, the EU 2020 Strategy, the governmental programme, and the reform of the 
municipal system are also a „resource‟ for the Centralists and a „constraint‟ for the 
Regionalists. The other changes do not directly influence coalition strategies. 
  
                                               
57
 This change is classified in the category “3. Changes in systemic governing coalition”. 
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4.3.1.2. Relatively stable parameters 
 
The relatively stable parameters rarely change, and are thus normally not in a key role 
when the playing field, the policy sector in question, changes. According to Sabatier, 
the relatively stable system parameters include the “basic constitutional structure, socio-
cultural values, and natural resources of a political system” (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 102). 
However, it could be argued that there are two crucial changes that have taken place in 
the relatively stable system parameters.  
 
Firstly, the Finnish government has undertaken a substantial savings programme that is 
aimed at cutting the staff of the public administration and making it more efficient.
58
 
This affects ministries and the public sector state administration in particular. As a 
consequence, the funds available to the public sector, and the ministries, have been 
substantially reduced. As seen below, this has encouraged some ministries to seek 
funding through the structural funds. Secondly, the Finnish share of EU funds is likely 
to be reduced in the next budgetary programme period. There is less money available in 
cohesion policy.
59
 Together, these measures of austerity and budgetary decreases form, 
to use the ACF theory, „constraints‟ and „resources‟ for the policy actors. They have to 
take these factors into account when they form their policy strategies. It could be argued 
that one consequence of these two changes has been that all the policy actors seem to 
accept the need to focus on a fewer investment priorities, to join together the ESF and 
the ERDF, and to reduce the administration involved in the management of the 
structural fund programmes, in line with the EU 2020 Strategy.  
A member of Coalition A: 
 
Respondent A: On an EU scale, the goal-setting has changed since the previous programme 
period. Now we want more [thematically] focused structural fund policy. And the Europe 2020 
Strategy aims at that, that we would have more targeted, and more focused, and hence more 
effective.. [regional policy]. 
--- 
Respondent A: And that will be reflected here on the national level, in that the supported structural 
fund [policy] will be more [thematically] focused in the next programme period. 
--- 
Respondent A: One can thus say that a change in the policy line is in sight, but it is not at all seen 
as a bad thing as such. 
 
                                               
58
 The governmental savings programme could be classified belonging to the category “2. Basic 
distribution of natural resources”. 
59
 The decrease in EU funding could also be classified in the same category as the governmental savings 
programme. 
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The fact that the governmental programme and the Europe 2020 Strategy have clearly 
set the goal of increased focusing on fewer goals for the structural fund investments 
clearly makes it natural for actors to advocate for a similar policy line. On the other 
hand, actors who would instead want to focus on several priorities are disadvantaged 
and constrained by the government‟s policy line, and the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
Furthermore, all the interviewees seemed to accept the joining together of the ESF and 
the ERDF. Given that these two funds are separate entities in the 2007-2013 programme 
period, we can here too identify a change in policy preferences.
60
 
4.3.2. Feedback from the current structural fund programme period and policy 
learning 
 
Together with the external system events, the relatively stable system parameters, and 
the feedback from (policy output and policy impact) the previous programme periods, 
the policy actors form their policy strategies. The ACF model implies that the policy 
outputs and policy impacts that result from the previous policies influence the actors' 
policy goals for the future (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 102). In other words, the policy actors 
may change their policy preferences if they learn that something is „wrong‟ with the 
current policy, or that it does not provide sufficient results. In the interviews, the 
respondents were asked what they had learned, and whether their policy preferences had 
changed during the course of the current programme period. The respondents identified 
the following changes in their policy goals: 
Feedback and policy learning 
 
 More emphasis on the climate issues 
 More emphasis on the poor and the excluded 
 More emphasis on fighting youth unemployment 
 Less structural funds bureaucracy, lightening the administration 
 Perception that the bureaucracy surrounding the structural funds 
programmes has grown too heavy and burdensome, and therefore the 
funds are wasted in administration, and not to the projects, where they 
should be used 
 Bigger projects with EU funds 
 The programme borders are too strict, hence a single programme to 
enable more flexible projects across the regional borders and to make 
sure that all the funds are used 
 More thematic focus 
 
                                               
60
 The ACF would call this policy learning. 
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When we combine the above-mentioned “lessons learned” with the constraints and 
resources that shape the actors‟ preferences, we get the actors‟ policy goals and 
strategies for the next policy period. (Sabatier, 1998, pp. 102) 
4.3.3. Assessing the validity of the hypotheses 
 
The validity of the hypotheses was also assessed. To summarise the findings briefly, 
hypothesis 1, 2, 5, and 9 were confirmed. The validity of hypotheses 3 and 4 could not 
be adequately well assessed.
61
 The hypotheses of the ACF were: 
Hypothesis 1: On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs 
are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be stable over periods of a decade 
or so. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on 
issues pertaining to the policy core, although less so on secondary aspects. 
 
Hypothesis 3: An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of his (its) belief 
system before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (revised in 1993): The policy core attributes of a governmental program in a 
specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy 
coalition that instituted the program remains in power within that jurisdiction – except 
when the change is imposed by a hierarchically superior jurisdiction. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (1997): Significant perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g. changes in 
socio-economic conditions, public opinion, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy 
outputs from other subsystems) are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the 
policy core attributes of a governmental program. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is a 
forum which is: 
 
(a) Prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate; and  
 
(b) Dominated by professional norms.  
  
(Sabatier, 1998, pp. 106) 
 
As argued, hypothesis 1 was confirmed. The interviews indicated that the coalitions had 
remained relatively stable over the years. Indeed, as shown by the division within the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy (the former Regional Department of the 
former Ministry of the Interior had maintained its allegiance to the Regionalists‟ 
coalition), the line-up of allies had remained stable over a long period. Hypothesis 2 
was also confirmed. The policy core united the coalitions‟ members, and they had 
differing opinions regarding secondary aspects of the Partnership Contract, such as 
                                               
61
 Hypothesis 3 could not be assessed for the lack of relevant information regarding policy learning in the 
secondary beliefs. As mentioned, the group had not had yet properly discussed the investment priorities. 
Hypothesis 4‟s validity could not be assessed for the final policy was not yet decided. 
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whether the ESF and the ERDF should be joined together, or whether more focus 
should be put on combating exclusion, or investing in education and retraining.
62
 
Hypothesis 5 turned out to be particularly fruitful to the analysis. The economic crisis 
and its consequences (the governmental programme, budgetary cuts, and EU 2020 
Strategy) were significant perturbations, which had greatly affected the policy strategies 
of the two coalitions by altering the conditions of the „playing field‟. Hypothesis 9 was 
confirmed, too. The Working Group had clearly acted as a policy forum where the 
policy actors had learned from each other. 
 
In sum, this chapter has provided an account of how the ACF model was applied to the 
study of EU regional policy networks in Finland. It could be argued that the model was 
applied successfully. The ACF provided the necessary theoretical tools to examine the 
work of the 2014+ Working Group. In general the model seems suitable to the study of 
regional policy networks. The interviews turned out to be a suitable method of data 
collection for a study of this nature. Indeed, the conversational nature of the interview 
enabled the researcher to ask rather difficult questions. The interviewees were positively 
surprised about the detailed nature of the questions, and many indicated that it was good 
for them to have to think about such questions. This seems to suggest that the research 
was „on the right track‟, in the sense that the researcher had the right idea about what to 
expect, and was therefore able to ask „the right questions‟. One could say that the ACF 
model proved surprisingly effective in filtering and analysing the data. The researcher 
clearly knew what he was looking for, and was able to design the interview 
questionnaire accordingly. Nevertheless, as discussed in this chapter, a few of the ACF 
model‟s critiques also proved helpful, in that they shed light on the weaknesses of the 
model. The interview data then confirmed these criticisms. This proves that no single 
model can account for every factor and variable, and should thus be complemented with 
other relevant theories and models. Nevertheless, the ACF can certainly be applied in 
similar studies in the future. 
  
                                               
62 However, as mentioned in footnote 61, the information regarding the secondary beliefs was not very 
extensive. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
According to Sabatier, the advocacy coalition‟s members are above all united by what 
he calls their „policy core beliefs‟. The policy core beliefs are the coalition‟s members‟ 
“basic perceptions concerning the general seriousness of the problem and its principal 
causes --- and strategies for realizing core values within the subsystem, such as --- the 
level of government best suited to deal with the problem, and the basic policy 
instruments to be used.” (Sabatier 1998, pp. 103) As for the debate in the Working 
Group over the institutional architecture, we can clearly derive two advocacy coalitions 
within the Working Group, whose members share the same basic perceptions 
concerning the policy problem, identify the same causes of the problem, and have 
identified the same strategies for realising their policy goals. Indeed, the two advocacy 
coalitions identified among the membership of the 2014+ Working Group are united 
above all by their perception of the appropriate level of government best suited to deal 
with the problem.  
 
Advocacy coalition A‟s members perceive that the regions and regional authorities 
should continue to be in charge of the administrative control of the structural fund 
programmes in order to get the best results from the structural fund investments. For 
members of advocacy coalition A, the policy solution is „more regionalisation‟ of the 
structural funds and „less central government control‟ over the structural funds. On the 
other hand, the members of advocacy coalition B are united above all by their goal of 
reducing the bureaucracy involved in the administration of the structural funds. Their 
policy strategy is to centralise the administrative control of the regional development 
programmes, and to reduce the involvement of the regions and regional authorities in 
the administration of the structural funds.  
 
These identified policy problems, the strategies that these two coalitions pursue to 
change the perceived problems, are the policy core beliefs of the two advocacy 
coalitions. Simplistically put, the Regionalists advocate for “less government, more 
regions”, and the Centralists advocate for “less regions, more central government”. 
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The research questions for this paper were: 
1. What are the key policy objectives of the members of the 2014+ Working 
Group regarding the policy priorities to be set out in the Partnership 
Contract? 
 
2. With what kind of arguments do these actors endeavour to advance their 
policy goals? 
 
3. Are there any identifiable „advocacy coalitions‟ within the 2014+ 
Working Group?  
 
4. If there are advocacy coalitions within the Working Group, what accounts 
for their common policy position? 
 
1. Concerning the first research question, this paper cannot fully discuss all the key 
objectives of the WG's members' organisations. As it has been written above, the WG 
has mostly focused on the institutional architecture question, and has not thus had time 
to discuss the investment priorities extensively. Most of the interviewees were of the 
opinion that the members have no major differences of opinion regarding the 
investment priorities, but it is arguably too early to say whether this is really the case. It 
may well be that a heated debate arises, once the WG really starts to narrow down the 
choices for the next thematic objectives. However, most interviewees held similar views 
on the desired policy for the next programme period. Indeed, in the light of the findings, 
we cannot identify any major divisions regarding the investment priorities. All the 
interviewees accepted the need to reduce the bureaucracy, to focus on fewer priorities to 
get better results, and to adopt the goals set out in the EU 2020 strategy. 
 
2. Interestingly, the policy actors had differing solutions to the identified problems. One 
group of actors was of the opinion that the administrative structure needed to be 
simplified by centralising the management of the programmes to the national level. 
They also approved the need to join together the ESF and the ERDF funds. The other 
group, on the other hand, considered the current arrangements appropriate, and only 
identified the need to join together the ESF and ERDF funds. In other words, both of the 
groups had the same goals, the reduction of bureaucracy, and the improvement of the 
efficiency of the structural fund programmes, but they advocated for differing solutions 
to the problem. 
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3. Two advocacy coalitions were identified. The first coalition was the Regionalists, and 
the second the Centralists. Their main difference of opinion concerned the 
administrative architecture. The Centralists wanted to centralise decision-making 
powers and the allocation of the funds, whereas the Regionalists were more or less 
satisfied with the present institutional arrangements. However, it is important to note 
that the interviewees did not mention the question of administrative structure as they 
were asked about their organisations' key policy objectives for the next programme 
period. They clearly separated the two issues: the investment priorities and the 
administrative architecture. All the interviewees thought that the WG had used too 
much time for discussing the institutional architecture. Had the Working Group 
properly discussed the investment priorities, we might see different advocacy coalitions 
than we see now. 
 
4. It has been established that the actors advocate for a policy that would at least ensure 
that their own and organisational welfare is maintained at the same level. The actors 
seek power and resources. However, it could be argued that the beliefs of the actors also 
play a role in determining what kind of policy they advocate. Many of the interviewees, 
especially people from Coalition A, argued that EU regional policy should be carried 
out in the regions. For them it was not only a question of organisational welfare (albeit 
that it is also a question of this too, as the Centralists would want the regional actors' 
powers dramatically reduced), but also a question of what regional policy is about. In 
their opinion, effective regional policy can only be carried out in the regions. Hence, the 
question over the institutional architecture was to some extent also a question of what 
one believes in. The Centralists, on the other hand, were united by their zeal for less 
bureaucracy. They considered the current powers of the regions to represent „too much 
bureaucracy‟. All in all, one cannot dismiss the importance of beliefs as the factor 
uniting the coalitions. One should account for both, the institutional and organisational 
welfare and the belief systems of the actors. 
 
The key finding in this paper is that the ACF can be applied to the study of EU regional 
policy networks in Finland. The ACF is a useful tool, which can help the researcher to 
identify what types of groupings of political actors exist within the regional policy 
networks, and what issues they consider crucial, and which factors affect the conditions 
in which they advocate for their interests. The fact that the ACF model could even 
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identify the division within the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, and to 
classify the ministry‟s staff into opposing advocacy coalitions, shows the usefulness of 
the model. With the help of the ACF model, this paper identified two advocacy 
coalitions within the sample analysed, the 2014+ Working Group. The belief system 
and the policy core beliefs of these advocacy coalitions‟ members were ident ified. 
However, only the members of the Regionalist coalition had coordinated their activities 
extensively. Nevertheless, given that the policy actors were able to meet and coordinate 
their action in the 2014+ Working Group‟s meetings, it seems justified to call these two 
policy networks „advocacy coalitions‟. 
 
This paper also confirmed two critiques of the ACF. Importantly, the critique from 
Schlager and Blomqvist on the ACF‟s failure to account for actors seeking to maximise 
their organisational and individual welfare was confirmed. Furthermore, Ingold and 
Varone‟s argument about the partiality of the policy broker was also confirmed. The 
policy broker had own interests in the „policy game‟, and was not therefore entirely 
neutral, contrary to the ACF‟s assumptions. These critiques of the ACF model should 
be taken into account, if the ACF model is applied to the study of EU regional policy 
networks in Finland in the future. 
 
In conclusion, this paper has provided an insight into the making of EU regional policy 
in Finland. It has successfully applied the advocacy coalition framework model to the 
study of policy networks in the Finnish EU regional policy subsystem. This paper has 
also provided an account of the „policy game‟ that takes place in the Finnish EU 
regional policy context. As expected, the Finnish government still plays the role of the 
„final gatekeeper‟. The partnership principle is a part of the rules of the game, but the 
government nevertheless has the final word. The methodological approach employed in 
this paper can be utilised in the future analysis of EU regional policy decision-making 
in Finland. For example, it would be interesting to examine which coalition finally 
became the „dominant coalition‟, imposing its will on the other policy actors, when the 
Partnership Contract is finally signed between the European Commission and Finland in 
2013.  
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Appendices 
 
Here I introduce the two questionnaires used in the interviews. The first questionnaire 
was used in the interview of a civil servant from the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy. The second model was used in interviewing the 2014+ Working Group's 
members. The interviews examine how well the ACF model's hypotheses are realised. 
When you see a word in "[]" this type of brackets after a question, it means that the 
question is related to that hypothesis.
63
 
 
The questions for a civil servant from the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy: 
 
Questions on the policy broker role of the civil servants 
 How would you describe the role of the secretaries in the work of the group? How 
are the tasks divided?  
 What are the main challenges when thinking about the group's work?  
 How are the members of the working group in contact to the secretariat the the 
chairpersons of the working group? 
 Do the members of the working group mainly try to influence the secretariat and the 
chairpersons in the meetings of the working group, or does lobbying take place also 
outside the meetings? 
  
General questions on the work of the 2014+ Working Group 
 On what basis have the members of the working group been chosen? Who has 
chosen them? 
 How is the partnership principle related to the work of the group? How is it adhered 
to in practise?  
 Is the partnership principle realised in practise? If not, then why?  
 What are the key changes regarding the current and the upcoming programme 
period when it comes to the ESF and the ERDF?  
 Who is in charge of the final Partnership Contract document? 
 
External system events 
 What are they key changes in the working environment that affect the goal-setting 
and content of the ERDF and the ESF programmes? Could you name three key 
changes, if there are any? 
 
Questions on the members of the Working Group 
 How would you describe the level of consensus on the issues? Do some members of 
the working group disagree with each other regarding the Partnership Contract? Do 
the members of the working group strive to reach a consensus on the matters 
discussed or are there clearly conflicting views in the working group on some 
matters? 
                                               
63
 For example, [policy learning] means that the question pertains to the policy learning hypothesis. 
   97 
 Can one see different groupings within the Working Group, which would advocate 
for differing policy objectives? [coalitions] If yes, then in which matters? 
 Have you observed that some members of the Working Group would have 
dramatically altered their stand of the policy content when comparing their policy 
objectives now and when the previous policy priorities were designed for the 2007–
2013 structural fund programme period? [policy learning]  
 
Thank you for your replies. 
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Interview of the 2014+ Working Group's members 
 
Introduction 
 A summary of the goals of the research 
 How the research is conducted + remarks on the confidentiality of the interview 
 A few guidelines for the interview + an estimate on the duration of the interview 
 Other background information 
 
Questions: 
 
Personal background & policy stand 
1. What is your position in the organisation you represent?  
2. How long have you worked in this field?  
3. As regards the 2014–2020 programme period of the Structural Funds, what kind 
of policy objectives do you advocate when it comes to the nationally designed 
priorities set out in the Partnership Contract? What are the fundamental, most 
important issues for you? [policy core + belief system] 
4. Why do you consider these policy priorities important? 
5. Have your policy objectives changed from the previous programme period? 
[policy learning] If yes, then why? 
6. Which working group members‟ views on the key goals for the next programme 
period are closest to your goals? In which matters? Do you coordinate your 
action with these people outside the meetings of the working group? [advocacy 
coalitions + policy coordination] 
7. Which WG‟s members‟ views differ the most from your views on the key goals 
for the next programme period? In which matters? 
8. Can one see different groupings within the Working Group, who would 
advocate for differing policy objectives? [coalitions]  
 
External system events 
9. What are they key changes in the working environment that affect the goal-setting 
and content of the ERDF and the ESF programmes? Could you name three key 
changes, if there are any? 
 
Policy brokers 
10. How would you describe the role of secretariat and the chairpersons in the work 
of the group?  
 
Partnership principle 
11. How is the Partnership principle related to the work of the group? How is it 
adhered to in practise?  
12. Is the partnership principle realised in practise? If not, then why? 
 
 
Thank you for your replies. 
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